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ABSTRACT 
Mixed property regimes are on the rise in the United States and 
in many other countries throughout the world.  Yet this fast-growing 
phenomenon currently lacks a broad-scale scholarly analysis aimed at 
extracting the shared theoretical principles of these intriguing prop-
erty configurations.  This Article offers an innovative analysis of the 
various types of mixed property regimes located along the sides of the 
private-common-public property triangle and within it.  This Article 
re-conceptualizes the property formations of Public-Private Partner-
ships and Common Interest Communities, and identifies and ana-
lyzes phenomena such as the Israeli Renewing Kibbutz, various forms 
of public-common property mixtures (e.g., the management and 
maintenance of city-owned parks in New York City), and tri-layered 
regimes such as Community Land Trusts.  In so doing, this Article of-
fers a first of its kind, comprehensive taxonomy of mixed property 
regimes. 
Although these different property patterns vary greatly in the 
way they create, allocate, and enforce entitlements and responsibili-
ties among the relevant parties, this Article identifies a consolidated 
theoretical basis for mixed property regimes, pointing as well to the 
normative advantages that these hybrid forms may have over purer 
property regimes, thus significantly enriching the property landscape. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The world of property regimes is currently in the midst of a vivid 
debate involving constant attempts to challenge and reconfigure tra-
ditional property patterns.  One reason for this is normative.  While 
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private property has been hailed as generally superior by many in 
Western legal and economic academia throughout large parts of the 
modern era, recent analysis points to the potential drawbacks of a 
massive transition toward privatization of publicly-owned resources, as 
well as to the inefficiencies of over-fragmentation of rights resulting 
from having “too much” private property.  Moreover, the renewed in-
terest in common property regimes,1 which has revealed the potential 
economic and social advantages of group ownership and manage-
ment of resources, further adds to the creation of a more balanced 
contest between the three vertices of the private-common-public 
property triangle.2
Another driving force for this property turmoil has been analyti-
cal, stemming from the observation that the nature of property de-
pends not only on formal ownership, but also on the specific compo-
sition of the property “bundle,” especially in the context of 
externalities and other types of conflicts over specific use rights in the 
resource.  This entitlements literature demonstrates that a single 
property regime may take numerous sub-forms depending on the 
type of strategy chosen for delineating rights in the different attrib-
utes of the resource at stake.  For example, authors have fixed the 
spectrum of private property demarcation between the “exclusion” 
and “governance” poles, the former delegating to the formal owner 
control over a large and indefinite class of uses and attributes, and 
the latter dispersing decision-making about the resource through ex-
tensive public or group governance regimes.3  Hence, the nature of 
 1 By the term “common property,” I refer to what is also termed “limited com-
mon property,” namely an asset which is shared by members of a given group, but is 
exclusive property with respect to outsiders.  Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of 
Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 
129, 139 (1998).  This distinguishes common property from an “open access” re-
source, in which everyone has a privilege of use, but correspondingly no one has a 
right to exclude others.  ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION 
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 23 (1990). 
 2 Although one also needs to consider the option of open-access resources, both 
theoretically and practically (for example, as with literary works following the termi-
nation of the designated copyright protection period), so that the property land-
scape could be portrayed instead as constituting a tetrahedron, I focus in this Article 
on private, common, and public property regimes, and hence I resort to the image of 
a triangle. 
 3 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 453–57 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Two Strate-
gies].  Michael Heller locates the governance axis between private despotic dominion 
on one end and public authority and control on the other, with intermediate forms 
of “property governance” in between.  Michael Heller, Common Interest Developments at 
the Crossroads of Legal Theory, 37 URB. LAW. 329, 331–32 (2005) [hereinafter Heller, 
Common]. 
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the property regime is prescribed not only by the formal rights alloca-
tion (chiefly the designation of “ownership”), but also by the question 
of who is assigned the power to make decisions about the different 
attributes and components of the resource. 
This Article argues that such a careful and contextual analysis of 
property should also create increasing awareness and normative sup-
port for explicit mixed types of property regimes, whenever these may 
prove optimal to obtain society’s goals.  Looking at the private-
common-public property triangle, one can observe a real-life prolif-
eration of property configurations that are located at interim points 
along the sides of the triangle and within it, thus largely departing 
from the traditional trichotomic division which has focused on the 
three vertices of property.  Although a few mixed property regimes 
have existed historically, contemporary market and public needs and 
preferences seem to push more than ever before toward the constant 
creation of new property mixtures.  However, this rapidly-growing 
phenomenon currently lacks a comprehensive, broad-scale analysis of 
mixed property regimes, aimed at extracting shared theoretical prin-
ciples.  This is exactly what this Article sets out to do. 
Whereas certain property configurations along the public-private 
and the private-common sides of the property triangle have been 
studied separately (such as Public-Private Partnerships or Common 
Interest Communities), the very existence of the third side, that of 
the public-common, has been largely ignored.  This Article sheds 
light on this unilluminated side of the triangle by identifying and 
analyzing various types of what I term “public commons” and by 
combining this innovative analysis within the broader framework of 
mixed property regimes. 
Moreover, aiming at a fuller exploration of the property triangle 
(although one obviously cannot completely cover it, let alone within 
the scope of a single research project), this Article also looks at the 
intriguing phenomenon of tri-layered property regimes located at the 
heart of the triangle, namely, those unique property configurations 
which explicitly aim at providing a more-or-less equal balance be-
tween private, common, and public interests in structuring the own-
ership and management scheme for a certain resource. 
Although the different mixed property regimes vary greatly in 
the way they create, allocate, and enforce entitlements and responsi-
bilities among the relevant parties, they do share some theoretical 
features that may also point to the normative advantages that these 
hybrid forms may have over traditional, purer property regimes.  In 
some cases, however, current doctrines that govern these property 
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mixtures are unsatisfactory—which is unsurprising given that many of 
these doctrines were established based on the trichotomic para-
digm—and must therefore be amended in order to allow for mixed 
property regimes to fully flourish and to considerably enrich the 
property landscape. 
At the outset, I find it important to make the following points 
regarding the scope, methodology, and ambition of this Article. 
First, this Article’s point of departure in discussing the triangle’s 
vertices (i.e., “pure” property regimes) largely adheres to the conven-
tional typology of private, common, and public property.4  This 
means that I identify a certain property regime as pure or nearly pure 
when both the formal rights allocation and the decisionmaking ca-
pacities generally point in the same direction.  Obviously, in very few 
instances, if any, one can expect a perfect match between these two 
realms, or even a strict “purity” in one of them.  Indeed, it would be 
safe to say that basically all real-life resources exhibit some kind of 
property mixture.5  And yet, for a significant number of resources, 
one can identify substantial prominence for one type of regime, such 
that it can be located in relative proximity to one of property’s verti-
ces.  I thus believe that although the conventional typology is unsatis-
factory in that it misses out on much of the property landscape, it is 
neither a theoretically empty concept nor a practically empty group. 
Second, as stated, the mixed property forms discussed in this Ar-
ticle do not purport to be an exhaustive list or anything close to it.  
The examples put forward represent intriguing examples of the evo-
lution and formation of certain types of mixed property regimes.  
This is done with the hope that the conceptualization and initial 
analysis in this Article will be of aid in illuminating and understand-
ing other property mixtures that are not overtly discussed here. 
Third, this project is not driven by a single normative agenda 
(such as promotion of efficiency, liberty, or equity), nor does it aim at 
providing a unified key for choosing between different types of pure 
or mixed property regimes.  The Article does construct, however, a 
 4 See DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP 
INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 8–14 (2002) (offering a critical discus-
sion of this typology). 
 5 In the context of land, all privately-owned lands in modern life, even those not 
located in dense urban areas, are subject to significant government regulation and 
other types of external control.  See Eduardo Moisès Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Un-
justified Preference for Landownership in Regulatory Taking Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 
251–53 (2004).  Similarly, public lands almost inherently implicate private rights and 
interests.  See Jim Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 241 (1994). 
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theoretical framework for the concept of property mixtures and ex-
plicates ways in which certain values and goals—as chosen by society’s 
institutions—can be promoted, or perhaps inhibited, by different 
concoctions of property forms.  This Article’s primary purpose is thus 
to identify, analyze, and illuminate the theoretical and policy implica-
tions of the larger spectrum of institutional property choices.  In so 
doing, it offers some initial tools for normatively evaluating the possi-
ble pros and cons of a societal recognition in certain innovative types 
of property regimes, not only in the sense of enforcing it among the 
directly involved parties, but also by validating the proprietary charac-
teristics of these regimes vis-à-vis government, third parties and the 
public at large.6
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines the contempo-
rary partial disillusionment with the ability of private property to 
serve as a panacea for the universe of resources, and studies the in-
creasing number of arguments made in favor of the common prop-
erty and public property options.  It then explains why the choice 
does not have to be narrowed down to these three alternatives by 
briefly revealing the past experience and present potential of mixed 
property regimes. 
The following parts study these latter types of alternatives in de-
tail.  Part II looks at the public-private continuum, focusing attention 
on the current forms of Public-Private Partnerships and on the 
greater role that the law needs to play to arrive at a proper balance 
between the private and public interests in such collaborative 
schemes. 
Part III examines private-common property, looking at two fas-
cinating different configurations of this mixture.  It first examines 
Common Interest Communities, which have become a systematic 
choice of homebuyers throughout the U.S., and re-conceptualizes 
these institutions based on the contract-based theory of property as 
the residual claim to the resource’s attributes.  It then looks at the 
dramatic changes that the Israeli Kibbutz—once the paradigm of 
pure common property—went through in the past few years by shift-
ing to an interim property model that combines incentives for private 
productivity alongside the maintenance of a newly-defined core ide-
ology of solidarity and social justice. 
Part IV identifies the “public commons” by focusing on the case 
study of New York City’s publicly-owned spaces.  These resources, and 
 6 See Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J (forthcoming 2008) (discuss-
ing the characteristics of the institution of property as combining in rem and in per-
sonam traits). 
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especially the city’s nearly 1800 parks, have become the subject of 
numerous models of systematic local community involvement, both 
formal and informal, in the maintenance, stewardship, and im-
provement of these resources, thus locating many of these spaces in 
an intriguing balance between the interests of the general public and 
those of the geographically-adjacent local groups of users. 
Part V studies tri-layered regimes by looking at the growing phe-
nomenon of Community Land Trusts, an innovative mechanism for 
the creation of long-lasting affordable housing through a unique 
formal structure that tries to draw the fine line between the interests 
of the affordable housing dwellers, as individuals and as a group, and 
those of the larger community. 
Part VI delineates the initial contours of a theory of mixed prop-
erty regimes.  It demonstrates the need for mixed property regimes 
when utilitarian and non-utilitarian considerations do not conform to 
pure or nearly-pure property regimes.  It also explains the greater 
flexibility that mixed property regimes possess both in engaging in 
innovative trial-and-error schemes and in confronting the everlasting 
challenge of dividing the law, and property law in particular, into dis-
tinct categories in a manner that ensures a sufficient level of stability 
and certainty but that at the same time maintains normative and 
practical integrity. 
I. THE MARKET FOR MIXED PROPERTY REGIMES 
A. The Limits of Private Property 
In what is by now a true property classic, Harold Demsetz’s To-
ward a Theory of Property Rights offers an evolutionary analysis (accom-
panied by vigorous normative support) of human society’s shift to 
private property as the pressure on resources increases and techno-
logical or organizational innovations enable cost-effective delineation 
and protection of private property.7  According to Demsetz’s norma-
tive analysis, private property creates incentives for socially desirable 
investment in resources by making the owner internalize both the 
positive and negative effects of his actions, thus unifying the private 
cost-benefit analysis with the respective social calculus.8  Even if cer-
 7 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 
(1967) [hereinafter  Demsetz, Theory I]. 
 8 Id. at 347–50.  The origins of this analysis go back to thinkers such as Adam 
Smith, William Blackstone, and Jeremy Bentham.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360–64 
(2001). 
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tain human actions still defy the borders of private property, the bet-
ter feasibility of a relatively small number of neighboring owners to 
resolve such residual externalities adds to the superiority of private 
property over “communal property,” let alone over state ownership.9
The argument for private property has not relied merely on 
economic instrumentality.  Significantly, it has been advanced in 
Western thought as a promoter of individual liberty,10 political free-
dom,11 personhood constitution,12 the intrinsic virtue of labor,13 and 
so forth.14  The fall of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s has allegedly 
made this multi-faceted argument for private property supremacy an 
open-and-shut case.15
However, recent years have seen the development of more modi-
fied approaches, which often criticize the tendency toward sweeping 
privatization of the universe of resources.  Three lines of argument 
are of particular interest here, as they also point to the viability of 
other property regimes, including hybrids. 
First, the decision whether to shift to private property is often not 
motivated by benign entrepreneurship seeking to snatch resource 
productivity from the jaws of collective action tragedies, but rather by 
rent-capturing facilitated through superiority in the political process.  
For example, the enclosure movement’s abolition of traditional 
communal property forms in Europe and in its colonies was designed 
in large part, with its distributional outcomes in mind, by employing 
 9 Demsetz, Theory I, supra note 7, at 354−59.  Other authors have discussed later 
developments of the evolutional theory of private property rights based on Demsetz’s 
basic insights.  See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property 
Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 118 (T.L. Anderson & 
F.S. McChesney eds., 2003); Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino’s Horn: Incomplete Property 
Rights and the Optimal Value of an Asset, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (2002). 
 10 See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PROPERTY AS THE GUARANTOR OF LIBERTY 59 
(1993); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 279−81 (1999); LAURA UNDERKUFFLER, 
THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 40 (2003). 
 11 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7−21 (1962). 
 12 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 36−59 (1993). 
 13 See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 254−56, 285−87 (1990). 
 14 This is obviously not to say that such non-instrumental values are uncontested. 
See Eduardo Moisès Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1907–38 (2005) 
(critiquing the liberty argument as promoting the ideal of property as facilitating an 
exit from society); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 329 (1996) (offering a critique of the various justifications for elevating private 
property to the status of the key right). 
 15 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition Between 
Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 653, 653 (2002) [hereinafter Dem-
setz, Theory II] (arguing that the shift to capitalist-style economies in Eastern Europe, 
Russia, and China has brought private property to a previously unattained level of 
importance in the world). 
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allegedly neutral property reorganization techniques aimed at bene-
fiting the rich or politically powerful.16  Similarly, the propertization 
of information resources of the West, while instilling open access to 
information resources that are prevalent in other parts of the world, 
such as genetic resources and traditional knowledge, has been criti-
cized as a political and distributional enterprise not necessarily loyal 
to either efficiency or justice.17
Conversely, the delay in development of individual transferable 
quotas in U.S. federal coastal fisheries may be explained by the mul-
tiple veto points that are provided by political institutions and ex-
ploited by interest groups to slow the pace of change, chiefly because 
of distributive disputes about the initial allocation of the tradable 
rights.18  These criticisms point to the conclusion that in fact neither 
a change to private property from open-access, common, or public 
property regimes necessarily promotes society’s declared goals, nor 
does a rejection of privatization of certain resources necessarily indi-
cate that such a regime is inferior under the relevant circumstances.19
Second, private property may often lead to a scenario of over-
fragmentation of rights, in which every one of the multiple owners 
has a right to exclude others from a resource such that no one has an 
effective privilege of use.20  This anticommons dynamics may, inter 
alia, deter socially desirable innovation (such as when granting pat-
ents in isolated gene fragments hampers development of integrative 
biomedical products),21 or otherwise prevent the pooling together of 
 16 Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 
365−70 (2002).  I do not argue that the enclosure movement had no utilitarian mer-
its.  I only wish to remark in this context that the true motives for this phenomenon, 
and the specific ways in which it was designed, were largely influenced by other im-
plicit but significant types of considerations. 
 17 Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. 
L. REV. 1331, 1339−57 (2004). 
 18 Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private 
Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 224−26 (2005). 
 19 In many developing countries, rising resource values do not necessarily result 
in the creation of private property rights, but rather in an inefficient regime of open 
access.  This is because the polynormative and multilayered structure of these socie-
ties does not enable state agencies to effectively enforce formal property rights 
against local groups, while at the same time the reliance of these communities on in-
formal norms and self-enforcement is insufficient to exclude outsiders.  Daniel Fitz-
patrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy of Con-
tested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1001 (2006). 
 20 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 667−79 (1998). 
 21 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovations? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); Cynthia D. Lopez-Beverage, 
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resources for efficient reorganization (for example, when landowners 
in a rundown urban area fail to agree on a comprehensive redevel-
opment scheme).22
In some cases, the private property bundle can be arranged to 
mitigate such grave consequences of sub-optimality.  For example, 
the common law of nuisance, which requires the plaintiff to meet a 
certain threshold of interference, and at times limits his rights to a 
liability rule protection (court-determined damages) thus allowing 
the defendant’s conflicting activity to continue, can be explained by 
the desire to prevent paralysis in a world of substantial transaction 
costs.23  This is especially so when the benefits of a certain action that 
physically exceeds property borders far outweighs the damage to the 
affected property owner, such that a use-specific switch to a “govern-
ance” regime at the expense of the “exclusion” default of private 
property avoids severe deadweight losses.24
Beyond such reshaping of private property, the anticommons di-
lemma may point to the potential advantages of other property re-
gimes.  For example, general circulation and commerce routes have 
been historically supplied publicly (as is still generally the case today), 
given the high transaction costs of organizing a private system of 
easements,25 as well as the positive synergy or network effect of open-
ing such routes to use by the general public.26  The advantages of the 
publicness of such conduits, which allows for the development of pri-
vate activity channeling through them, has prompted calls to extend 
public ownership or governance to new domains, such as cyber-
space.27  Moreover, the ability of property governance to promote so-
cially beneficial collective action inspired an academic renaissance of 
common property regimes, with authors pointing, inter alia, to the 
advantages of economies of scale and risk-spreading,28 enhanced self-
Should Congress Do Something about Upstream Clogging Caused by the Deficient Utility of Ex-
pressed Sequence Tag Patents?, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 35, 78−82 (2005). 
 22 Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704 
(2007). 
 23 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 
965, 1037−45 (2004). 
 24 Id.  In a classic example, the New York Court of Appeals refused to grant an 
injunction in favor of several dozen neighboring landowners against a polluting ce-
ment factory, and restricted their remedy to the payment of permanent damages.  
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) 
 25 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1381−82 (1993). 
 26 Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property 
in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 96−100 (2003). 
 27 Id. at 100−02. 
 28 Ellickson, supra note 25, at 1332−44. 
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monitoring and enforcement of appropriation and contribution rules 
through internal norms,29 and affirmative portioning of the collec-
tively-owned assets from the private holdings of the stakeholders (es-
pecially in corporations),30 alongside social and psychological bene-
fits resulting from joint ownership.31
Third, recent analysis based on accumulated experience in the 
U.S. and throughout the world points to the limits of privatization of 
traditionally public resources.  Conventional wisdom specified that 
because government producers have no high-powered incentives to 
hold down production costs or to improve the quality of output,32 in-
creasing involvement of the private sector in the production and fi-
nancing of such resources would enhance efficiency,33 given also the 
stimulating effect of competition between different providers.34  
These assumptions seem to be generally valid for the market provi-
sion of private goods for which profit is the main objective.35  They 
may also hold true for the heavily-regulated yet private provision of 
public utilities,36 or for the outsourced provision of pure or mixed 
 29 OSTROM, supra note 1, at 88−102, 185−92. 
 30 This shields the corporation’s assets from the creditors of shareholders.  Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 
387, 393−98 (2000). 
 31 Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 
573−74 (2001).  I definitely do not argue that all property formations usually typified 
in the literature as “common property” are identical.  In Parts III and IV, I reconcep-
tualize some of these dominant forms as either “private-common” or “public-
common” mixtures, and I show how commercial corporations, Common Interest 
Communities, group-managed fisheries, and Kibbutzim—to name but a few exam-
ples of regimes often labeled as “commons”—are in effect very different from one 
another. 
 32 Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1426−29 (2003) (attributing this to citizens’ rational apathy, 
the absence of a market for corporate control, and a lack of dependence of public 
enterprises on capital to survive). 
 33 See DONALD F. KETTL, SHARING POWER: PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND PRIVATE 
MARKETS 14−17 (1993); E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
111−25 (2000). 
 34 One should be careful of equating privatization with competition.  A private 
firm in a certain field of expertise may have no effective competition.  On the other 
hand, it is possible to have several governmental entities competing to supply a ser-
vice.  See Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and Application to 
Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1129 (1997). 
 35 See William L. Megginson & Jeffrey M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of 
Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321 (2001) (offering empirical sup-
port for this proposition).  There have been, however, notable failures.  See Bernard 
Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 1731 (2000). 
 36 Public utilities, such as water and electricity, were often portrayed as “natural 
monopolies,” not only making open competitive provision inordinately costly, but 
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public goods,37 whenever the government or the private end-users 
can effectively evaluate and monitor the quality of output.38  Never-
theless, there are prominent normative constraints on further ex-
tending the scope of reliance on private provision. 
These qualifications have special force for goods and services 
that involve a complex set of objectives aimed at maximizing social 
welfare rather than merely profit, as is the case with education, social 
services, managed medical care, police, and prisons.  Although in 
principle the government could promote these various objectives 
through contracts with private suppliers, this complexity often yields 
“contract incompleteness,” meaning that the government can neither 
easily spell out in a contract the determinants of quality nor can it 
monitor and enforce such conditions during the service provision.39  
Consequently, the private supplier, who is chiefly motivated by profit 
maximizing, may engage in cost-reducing quality-shading that will of-
ten go unobserved or unpunished.40  This is especially the case with 
service components such as inmate rehabilitation41 or promotion of 
educational values such as democracy and tolerance,42 or with the 
also creating the problems of a monopoly, which necessitate governmental owner-
ship of the distribution networks, or at least heavy regulation.  NEIL BRUCE, PUBLIC 
FINANCE AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 41−43 (2d ed. 2001).  This conventional wis-
dom has been challenged in recent literature.  Critics argue that such industries were 
actually “political monopolies,” as they have historically required legal protection 
against competition.  See generally THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION 
AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. 
Cole eds., 2003). 
 37 See infra note 102 and accompanying text (offering a definition of public 
goods). 
 38 Examples for such mixed public goods are cleaning and refuse collection.  See 
Paul H. Jensen & Robin E. Stonecash, Incentives and the Efficiency of Public Sector Out-
sourcing Contracts, 19 J. ECON. SURV. 767, 771−72 (2005).  In such cases, private suppli-
ers would be punished for cost-cutting deterioration in quality.  Hart et al., supra 
note 34, at 1144. 
 39 Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Applica-
tion to Public-Private Partnerships, 113 ECON. J. 69, 70 (2003); Hart et al., supra note 34, 
at 1150−52. 
 40 Jensen & Stonecash, supra note 38, at 773. 
 41 See Patrick Bayer & David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facili-
ties: Public Versus Private Management, 48 J.L. & ECON. 549, 554 (2005) (arguing that 
under standard contracts, a for-profit operator has almost no contractual incentives 
to provide rehabilitation opportunities, and demonstrating that the rate of recidivism 
for juvenile offenders released from private correctional facilities in Florida is sub-
stantially higher than in public facilities). 
 42 John R. Lott, An Explanation for Private Provision of Schooling: The Importance of 
Indoctrination, 33 J.L. & ECON. 199, 210–12 (1990).  But cf. Andrei Shleifer, State versus 
Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 146−47 (1998) (doubting the benefits of 
ideological education). 
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cost-reduction bias in the exercising of discretion by private suppliers 
regarding expensive-to-treat patients, welfare recipients with low 
probability of job placement, or students with special educational 
needs.43
In addition, for even more crystallized components that can be 
specifically enumerated in the contract, governments often fail to 
conduct adequate supervision,44 and may also be “held up” during 
the term of the contract to improve its provisions in favor of the pri-
vate supplier.45  When the government loses its relevant institutional 
knowledge over time, it may be practically unable to take back the 
reins, even if it is unsatisfied with the private provision and no viable 
competition otherwise disciplines the contractor.46
Moreover, an excessive delegation of governmental powers to 
private entities in the implementation of public programs largely un-
dermines the ability to promote a democratic debate about primary 
social priorities and moral judgments, and fails to adequately reflect 
changes in such values over time.47  Most of these public programs 
are funded publicly—either fully (e.g., welfare) or partially (e.g., 
educational vouchers)—because they are driven by extra-market val-
ues such as vertical equity and the creation of a social “safety net.”48  
Even services that are publicly financed because they possess the eco-
nomic traits of public goods (such as preservation of public law and 
order through policing and imprisonment) are often intertwined 
 43 Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1377−94 
(2003). 
 44 See RONALD C. FISHER, STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE 161−62 (3d ed. 2005); 
David M. Van Slyke, The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social Services, 63 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 296, 305−08 (2003). 
 45 Jensen & Stonecash, supra note 38, at 775−77.  But cf. Ronald J. Daniels & Mi-
chael J. Trebilcock, An Organizational Analysis of the Public-Private Partnership in the Pro-
vision of Public Infrastructure, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS 93, 102 (Pauline 
Vaillancourt Rosenau ed., 2000) (pointing to government opportunism in abrogat-
ing contractual commitments). 
 46 Jonathan Walters, Going Outside, GOVERNING MAG., May 2004, at 23 (discussing 
the State of Texas’s plan to pass on to private firms decisionmaking about individual 
eligibility for welfare, and contentions that the resulting loss of institutional knowl-
edge may not be retrieved by government). 
 47 See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1246–55 (2003); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on 
Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 421–32 (2006). 
 48 Stephen H. Linder & Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau, Mapping the Terrain of the 
Public-Private Policy Partnership, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS 1, 3 (Pauline 
Vaillancourt Rosenau ed., 2000). 
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with intricate moral considerations that may be inadequately ad-
dressed by both for-profit and not-for-profit private agents.49
This is not to say that the lack of high-powered incentives for 
profit maximization in the public sector yields satisfactory results,50 
and one may indeed be skeptical as to what extent public officials and 
employees are driven by a sense of “mission” that motivates them to-
ward quality enhancement.51  But this is exactly the point that is 
learned by growing experience: the public-private dilemma is not a 
dichotomous struggle in which one side universally prevails.  The de-
sign of sophisticated public programs, and the identification of the 
proper allocation of roles in their design and implementation, is not 
only a highly-contextual endeavor, but one that must often result in 
the adoption of a mixed regime that seeks to build on the compara-
tive advantages of both types of agents and incentive structures. 
B. Mixed Property: Past Experience, Present Potential 
The empirical and theoretical evaluation of alternative property 
regimes, especially the qualifications of a wholesale embracing of pri-
vate property regimes, leads to a growing recognition of the need to 
craft sophisticated mixed regimes in many contexts.  This poses a ma-
jor challenge to the legal system, which has been very much accus-
tomed to operating in molds that are based on the trilateral distinc-
tion between private, common, and public property. 
Various mixed property regimes have existed throughout his-
tory.  One example is the medieval open-field system in northern 
Europe, in which peasants owned scattered strips of land for grain 
growing but used the land collectively for grazing.52  Another instance 
is the common law custom doctrine, according to which residents of 
 49 Non-profits have been often hailed as combining incentives for efficiency 
alongside commitment to public values.  Recent research, however, points to prob-
lems of unaccountability, lack of competition, insufficient administrative capacity, 
and dependence on public funds which can lead to mission drift and diminished 
quality.  Van Slyke, supra note 44, at 298. 
 50 See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 
446–48, 508–16 (2005) (arguing that both public and private prisons fail to meet the 
legitimate standards of penal policies and practices in a liberal democracy). 
 51 See Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Competition and Incentives with Motivated 
Agents, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 616, 616–18, 628–30 (2005) (offering the “mission” argu-
ment, said to apply to both public bureaucracies and private non-profits).  But see 
Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 32, at 1447–51 (arguing that private accountabil-
ity mechanisms, such as competition, cause actors to behave as though public-
spirited, whereas public decisionmaking may be distorted by public choice mecha-
nisms). 
 52 Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (2000). 
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given localities could claim collective rights to use otherwise private 
lands in which group activities had customarily existed without dis-
pute for generations.53  Colonial and early American cities were cor-
porate-like associations that, along with their distinctive member-
group status, exercised government-like functions.54  Privately-owned 
public utilities and common carriers, holding de facto or de jure mo-
nopolistic powers, were traditionally subjected to certain government-
like duties given their “public calling.”55
However, the multitude of mixed property regimes designed in 
both theory and practice over the past few decades, especially follow-
ing the disillusionment with the alleged omnipotence of private 
property, mandates a distinctive and comprehensive analysis.  In the 
following parts, I set out to identify prominent patterns of mixed re-
source ownership and management and to address the major difficul-
ties in legally conceptualizing these regimes to create innovative doc-
trines. 
II. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PROPERTY 
A. Property in Public-Private Partnerships 
The disadvantages of pure property regimes for the provision of 
certain services and goods have led to the rise of public-private mix-
tures.  Especially prominent are newly-crafted forms of Public-Private 
Partnerships, such as the British Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
model,56 which have spread rapidly in many countries.57
 53 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 74–75 (fac-
simile ed. 1979) (1765).  Although many of these rights had vanished by the nine-
teenth century, some survived beyond that, especially in cases of customary recrea-
tional uses.  Carol Rose, The Comedy of Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 739–44 (1986). 
 54 During the nineteenth century, American courts developed a public/private 
distinction to solve the intermediate nature of corporations by dividing them into 
two categories, placing cities in the sphere of the state and private corporations in 
the individual sphere.  GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES 
WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 26–27, 36–45 (1999). 
 55 CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS: 
REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE 
STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY 199–221 (1986). 
 56 See generally HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, PFI: MEETING THE INVESTMENT CHALLENGE  
(2003); HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, PFI: STRENGTHENING LONG TERM PARTNERSHIPS 
(2006) [hereinafter H.M.F., STRENGTHENING LONG TERM]. 
 57 UNCITRAL, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON PRIVATELY FINANCED INFRASTRUCTURE PRO-
JECTS 1–21 (2001) [hereinafter UNCITRAL, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE]. 
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PFI contracts, covering numerous types of public service provi-
sion, including health, education, defense, prisons, and roads, have 
two major features that are distinct from traditional forms of out-
sourcing or procurement.  First, PFIs are long-term contracts that 
bundle design, building, finance, and operation, and are accordingly 
performed by a consortium of private firms, unlike the relatively 
short-term, task-specific outsourcing contracts.58  Second, in such pro-
jects, the government usually uses a system of output specifications by 
which it describes the required service and some basic standards, but 
it leaves the consortium with wide discretion over how to deliver the 
service input-wise.59
The PFI contract aims at creating a long-enduring socially opti-
mal division of rights, obligations, and liabilities between the par-
ties.60  Hence, risks are to be borne by the party best placed to man-
age them, meaning generally that the government underwrites the 
continuity of public demand for the service, as well other exogenous 
risks (such as a rise in inflation), whereas the private consortium typi-
cally assumes endogenous risks, such as construction costs and com-
pletion timetable, technological uncertainties, and the satisfaction of 
output requirements.61  By so doing, the “optimal” contract is de-
signed to properly balance risks and incentives: it seeks to mitigate 
problems of moral hazard on the part of the private contractor, but 
avoids allocating to the contractor types of risks it cannot effectively 
control; otherwise the contractor would charge an overly high risk 
premium ex ante that would largely negate the social benefits of risk-
shifting to the private sector.62
In similar fashion, the incentive structure design is built into the 
core rationale of bundling: exploiting synergies between the different 
stages of the project, by reducing transaction and coordination costs, 
allowing greater freedom from budget allocation and procurement 
regulations, and by encouraging innovation in service delivery and 
adequate maintenance during the contract’s time period.63  Here, 
however, one must be cautious of the possible drawbacks of this type 
 58 John Bennett & Elisabetta Lossa, Building and Managing Facilities for Public Ser-
vices 2–3 (CPMO Working Paper Series No. 05/137, Dec. 2005), available at 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/cmpo/workingpapers/wp137.pdf. 
 59 Id. 
 60 A.M. Abdel-Aziz & A.D. Russell, A Structure for Government Requirements in Public-
Private Partnerships, 28 CAN. J. CIV. ENG’G 891 (2001) (mapping the key features of 
public-private partnerships along these three dimensions). 
 61 H.M.F., STRENGTHENING LONG TERM, supra note 56, at 38–40. 
 62 Jensen & Stonecash, supra note 38, at 777–78. 
 63 Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 45, at 97–101. 
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of vertical integration.  One such drawback is reduced competition 
(because few consortia are able to assemble all the relevant input).64  
In some instances, inter-stage bundling will not only create positive 
cost-reducing externalities for the private consortium, but will also 
increase the likelihood of unobservable or unverifiable quality-
shading regarding the fluid components of the contract,65 in ways 
even more dramatic than in cases of traditional outsourcing.66
Viewed through this prism, the property structure of current 
Public-Private Partnerships may be explained by the contract-based 
concept of the core of property ownership as consisting of the “resid-
ual claim” to the resource at stake.  As Yoram Barzel explains, a re-
source consists of multiple attributes, not all of which are necessarily 
captured by contract, and are hence left in the “public domain”—the 
party that is able to capture these attributes, in view of such imperfect 
contractual delineation of the rights, may in fact be viewed as the re-
sidual claimant, or as holding the “economic property rights” to these 
attributes.67
To the extent that the government is contractually able to en-
sure the required quality of the public benefit from the resource, 
providing the private consortium residual control over the project 
seems socially desirable, for it allows the consortium to capture bene-
fits such as cost reduction or development of a new technology cre-
ated through effort or ingenuity without having to renegotiate with 
the government over this surplus.68  Conversely, when the consortium 
might potentially exploit this in order to substantially decrease the 
level of public benefit, the government should work to minimize the 
private party’s residual property powers. 
One possible way to do so, which follows from the almost inher-
ent incompleteness of many such projects, would be to incorporate 
legal standards such as “good faith” or “best efforts” into those por-
tions of the contract especially prone to incompleteness and hence to 
 64 Id. 
 65 See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. 
 66 Bennett & Lossa, supra note 58, at 4–6, 26–28.  Hence, bundling is appropriate 
when the quality of the public service’s output can be well-specified in the contract, 
whereas the quality of the project’s earlier construction stages cannot be so specified. 
Hart, supra note 39, at C74. 
 67 YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 90–96 (2d ed. 1997). 
 68 Hart et al., supra note 34, at 1129–30; Bennett & Lossa, supra note 58, at 4–5.  
But cf. Martin P. Sellers, Privatization Morphs into ‘Publicization’: Businesses Look a Lot 
Like Government, 81 PUB. MGMT. 607, 613–16, 618–19 (2003) (arguing that competi-
tion for government contracts, and that the considerable governmental control that 
creates standardization of contracts often causes private corporations to behave like 
governmental agencies, thus losing the potential benefits of market differentiation). 
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socially sub-optimal provision.69  Although an overuse of vague stan-
dards may decrease the willingness of private parties to enter into 
such partnerships or may otherwise affect the contract’s pricing and 
risk allocation, the substantial growth in discretion awarded to private 
parties in controlling access to governmental resources and benefits 
should be matched with normatively modest yet generally effective 
mechanisms aimed at resembling the basic principles of judicial re-
view of administrative decision-making.70
Another prominent property issue in Public-Private Partnerships 
concerns formal ownership of the resource at the end of the contract 
period.  The British position for PFI contracts is that the government 
should take ownership of assets where the future long-term, public-
sector demand is clear or where there is no realistic alternative use, as 
is the case with roads, schools, hospitals, prisons, and specialist in-
formation technology systems.71  This regime is also highly prevalent 
for such resources in the U.S. and Canada, where it is typically de-
fined as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contract,72 and also for 
large infrastructure projects throughout the world.73  Conversely, the 
residual value of the resource at the end of the PFI contract period is 
considered to be best transferred to the consortium for assets which 
have alternative uses—such as office accommodation in areas that 
have private sector demand or generic information technology sys-
tems—and for which there is no clear long-term public need.74
Obviously, post-contract governmental ownership of the re-
source has its price tag, since it adversely influences the consortium’s 
investment incentives ex ante, meaning that the government has to 
compensate the private party initially by setting up a long contract 
term or by ensuring higher periodic revenues for the consortium.75  
 69 See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of 
Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 189–91, 196–98 (2005) (arguing that 
when the parties have incomplete information in the pre-contract negotiations, they 
should opt for standards in the contract, trading front-end negotiation costs with the 
back-end, typically lower litigation costs). 
 70 See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 71 HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, STANDARDIZATION OF PFI CONTRACTS 125–27 (2004) 
[hereinafter H.M.T., STANDARDIZATION ]. 
 72 See PHILIP LANE BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON 
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 6.9 (2002) (offering a taxonomy of BOTs and closely related 
schemes). 
 73 See Abdel-Aziz & Russell, supra note 60 (reviewing several projects); 
UNCITRAL, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 57. 
 74 H.M.T., STANDARDIZATION, supra note 71, at 125–27.  This pattern is generally 
known in the U.S as a Build-Own-Operate (BOO) contract.  BRUNER & O’CONNOR, 
supra note 72, § 6.10. 
 75 Bennett & Lossa, supra note 58, at 27. 
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This facet of the resource’s residual value further constrains the gov-
ernment in evaluating the public benefit embedded in the project 
and in constructing the project’s specific property structure.76
Current forms of Public-Private Partnerships may therefore be 
located at the central segments of the public-private continuum, as 
the following chart suggests: 
 
heavily regulated 
private industries 
(monopolies/ sub-
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Public-Private 
Partnerships + 
residual private 
rights 
Public-Private 
Partnerships + 
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outsourcing 
public re-
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nancing +  
production) 
private 
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standard 
regulation 
Public           Private 
 
 
 
Chart 1 
The Public-Private Continuum 
 
To complete the property framework, however, these hybrid 
structures cannot be examined solely from the bilateral contract per-
spective.  Rather, the public side of the regime has to be further bro-
ken down to distinguish, in appropriate cases, between the govern-
ment and the individuals who have a distinctive interest in the public 
program in a way that would shed light on the role that the latter par-
ties may play as potential “residual claimants” to the resource at stake. 
B. Individual Beneficiaries as Property Stakeholders 
Public programs diverge in their implications for individual 
members of the general public of the relevant jurisdiction.  In some 
cases, the benefits resulting from the public program are generally 
indivisible and accrue to the members of the public at large.  This is 
the case, for example, with the preservation of law and order through 
policing and imprisonment.77
 76 See Timothy Besley & Mairteesh Ghatak, Government Versus Private Ownership of 
Public Goods, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1343 (2001) (arguing that the party with the highest 
valuation for the project should be its owner, irrespective of the parties’ relative lev-
els of financial investment in it). 
 77 FISHER, supra note 44, at 46–48. 
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In many cases, however, the public products of the program are 
translated into individually-based distinctive benefits.  Public utilities 
serve specific consumers, and public education, welfare, and medical 
care benefit certain individuals, as does the rehabilitation component 
of imprisonment services.78  While in these latter cases, where there 
also exists a more general public gain (e.g., the societal advantage of 
having better-educated citizens), one can still discern individual 
stakeholders whose interest in the program stands out from that of 
the general public.  To understand how such individual interests in 
the benefits of the public program may implicate mixed property re-
gimes, we must first identify the normative basis of individual enti-
tlements to the public program when provided directly by the gov-
ernment, and then make a second-stage normative analysis of public-
private provision of these services.79
The spectrum of public programs is obviously too wide in scope 
to allow for even a brief yet fair taxonomy within this Article.  Yet, 
what generally characterizes governmentally-provided services and 
goods is the myriad of legal norms governing their provision.  Along-
side contractual or quasi-contractual individual entitlements and re-
sponsibilities that apply to some of the governmental resources (such 
as common carriers, utilities, or medical care), individual entitle-
ments to governmental resources and to their various attributes are 
further governed by constitutional, statutory, and administrative 
norms.  Hence, for example, the scope of judicial recognition of pro-
cedural due process rights for beneficiaries of certain types of social 
welfare, in view of their “property” interest in such programs,80 has 
 78 Beyond services such as rehabilitation or medical treatment, inmates have an 
obvious interest in other issues pertaining to their imprisonment, such as the physi-
cal quality of the facilities, control of violence, and preservation of human dignity.  
See Dolovich, supra note 50, at 471–502.  Since privatization may implicate these in-
terests, especially because of the possible de-constitutionalization of prison manage-
rial activities, the debate over privatization extends also to such interests.  Id. 
 79 Although using the public provision benchmark may be controversial when-
ever there are reasons to think that it is in itself unsatisfactory, it may be still useful 
for isolating the impact of the transition to public-private provision on the beneficiar-
ies’ entitlements in the program. 
 80 The Supreme Court first recognized procedural due process rights for welfare 
recipients based on the “property” framework in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970).  However, in later cases the Court narrowed the application of this right by 
reasoning that the “property” interest is not created by the Constitution, but is rather 
created and defined by “existing rules or understandings that stem from an inde-
pendent source such as state law.”  Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).  
This positive law definition of the “property” interest allows the government to statu-
torily design the program in a way that would deprive its beneficiaries of procedural 
due process protection.  RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 598–615 (4th ed. 2002).  The Court has also offered a more recent analy-
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obvious implications on the property rights division between the gov-
ernment and the individual beneficiaries.81  Another prominent issue 
has been the application of the constitutional equal protection duty 
regarding, for example, municipal services or common carriers, 
whenever unequal provision is claimed to systematically adversely af-
fect members of protected classes.82
Beyond the application of such norms to drastic cases of explicit 
termination or systematic deprivation in the provision of governmen-
tal goods and services, the property structure of these programs is de-
signed by practices and norms governing the routine provision of 
such services—and especially those “grey areas” that may substantially 
implicate the quality and quantity of the services—in a way that indi-
cates who may be viewed as the “residual claimant” to the resource.  
Thus, for instance, as courts give greater deference to administrative 
discretion in implementing such services (e.g., quality of inmate re-
habilitation programs),83 and also to administrative interpretation of 
ambiguous provisions in the statute creating the public program,84 
the “property bundle” that the individual possesses in the resource’s 
attributes gets smaller.  Conversely, the existence of effective mecha-
nisms curbing governmental quality-shading in servicing beneficiaries 
strengthens individual entitlements to the resource. 
Thus, whenever a decision to move to public-private collaboration 
in the provision of a certain governmental program is not accompa-
sis of this “property” interest.  Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 
(2005) (holding that a wife did not have a protected “property” interest in police en-
forcement of a restraining order against an abusive husband). 
 81 See Richard H. Fallon, Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial Review, and Con-
stitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 327–55 (1993) (discussing the confused 
relationships between procedural due process resulting from a “property” interest 
and substantive due process claims). 
 82 In Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit concluded from statistical evidence that municipal services had been pro-
vided to different neighborhoods in a racially discriminatory manner.  437 F.2d 1286, 
1288 (5th Cir. 1971).  However, following the Supreme Court’s later decision in 
Washington v. Davis, plaintiffs are generally required to prove discriminatory intent 
beyond merely a disparate impact.  426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).  Compare Ammons v. 
Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 983 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding “discriminatory intent” in the 
provision of municipal services based on statistical, circumstantial, and historical evi-
dence), with N.Y. Urban League v. State of New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1033 (2d Cir. 
1995) (refusing to reach similar conclusions about the allocation of public funds to 
mass transit in the New York City area). 
 83 See Dolovich, supra note 50, at 484 –90 (discussing the narrow interpretation of 
constitutional rights of inmates, even in cases of serious physical harm, let alone in 
services such as rehabilitation). 
 84 See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 
(1984). 
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nied by an explicit policy choice to affect a change in the individual 
beneficiaries’ general status, the mixed property regime must be ad-
justed to maintain the individual “legitimate claim of entitlement”85 
within the property framework. 
What form should such beneficiaries’ rights take in the mixed 
property setting?  While resorting to more generalized mechanisms 
of “public accountability” aimed at fostering a public discourse about 
the underlying values of the public program may not give sufficient 
account to adversely affected interests of individual stakeholders,86 a 
universal application of the “state actor” doctrine to private entities 
contracting with the government,87 let alone a straightforward exten-
sion of public law into realms traditionally thought private,88 may 
have undesirable overreaching consequences.89
A more promising route is that of a careful development of the 
contract-based third-party beneficiary doctrine to cases in which pub-
lic-private provision of goods and services may undermine otherwise 
recognized individual entitlements.  Traditionally, courts have been 
reluctant to accord individual members of the public rights as third-
party beneficiaries of governmental contracts to perform services, 
unless the specific contract made it clear that this was intended.90  
This approach was driven, inter alia, by the fear of a multitude of 
claims and a chilling effect on the private party being contractually 
obligated to a limitless number of third parties.91  However, as of the 
1970s, the judiciary has shown gradual signs of willingness to apply 
this doctrine to government contracts.  Probably not surprisingly, this 
 85 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
 86 See Minow, supra note 47, at 1259–63 (calling for the assurance of “public ac-
countability” in Public-Private Partnerships). 
 87 For the narrow application of the “state action” doctrine in such contexts, see 
Sheila S. Kennedy, When is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Pub-
lic-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 203, 208–19 (2001); Metzger, 
supra note 43, at 1421–37. 
 88 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms through Privatization, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1315–29 (2003) (suggesting that privatization might extend pub-
lic values to private actors to ensure that Public-Private Partnerships are structured in 
democracy-enhancing ways). 
 89 See Metzger, supra note 43, at 1421–37 (suggesting that “constitutional ac-
countability” does not necessitate direct application of constitutional norms to the 
private party, and can be achieved by judicially requiring the government to create 
mechanisms protecting against private abuses). 
 90 A classic case in point is H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., in which the New 
York Court of Appeals rejected a claim by an owner of a warehouse which was 
burned down because the water company that contracted with the city failed to 
maintain adequate water pressure at its hydrants.  159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928). 
 91 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 688–91 (3d ed. 1999). 
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was done chiefly in the context of contracts for the provision of social 
assistance programs, of the kind that have been generally recognized 
as falling within the “new property” framework.92
The employment of the third-party beneficiary doctrine seems to 
have special appeal with the increase in number and complexity of 
public-private contracts.  As more government contracts become sub-
stantially incomplete by nature and entrust private entities with con-
siderable discretion over the implementation of complicated public 
programs, there is growing justification for enabling individual bene-
ficiaries to effectively monitor quality-shading and to capture at least 
some of the value located in the “grey areas” of the contract.  In so 
doing, individual beneficiaries may also be better motivated to en-
force vague standards included in the contract, such standards typi-
cally requiring the plaintiff to gather substantial information about 
both the specific contract’s implementation and general practices in 
similar programs.93
To mitigate the fear of over-fragmentation of the public pro-
gram’s structure, resulting in an anticommons scenario, the remedies 
awarded in cases of successful litigation initiated by individual benefi-
ciaries should be collective and nonpecuniary whenever possible, 
aimed at redirecting both the government and the private partner 
toward a proper implementation of the public program.  Hence, for 
example, contract-based judgments over issues such as managed 
medical care, school curriculum, or prison rehabilitation services 
should be generally oriented toward broad standard-setting that will 
illuminate the public-private contract based on the public program’s 
statutory (or other) basis, beyond the individual grievance that may 
have been the genesis of the litigation. 
In conclusion, the broadening reality of public-private property 
regimes realigns the property rights to such restructured resources.  
While legally validating the private providers’ residual claim to such 
 92 See, e.g., Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981) (viewing tenants of 
housing projects that are beneficiaries of the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment’s (HUD) Section 8 rental assistance programs as direct third-party benefi-
ciaries of the contracts between HUD and the project owners). 
 93 See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text (setting forth the justifications to 
include vague standards in Public-Private Partnerships contracts).  However, this tac-
tic might entail potential problems, such as moral hazard, occurring whenever the 
existence of vague standards would cause a party to strategically second-guess the 
original contract through ex post litigation.  Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Con-
tract Theory and the Limits of Contract, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 601–03 (2003).  This problem 
might be especially acute in the case of third-party beneficiaries, who can only bene-
fit from ex post challenges to the contract and do not face the direct risk of contract-
breaching. 
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resources may be socially optimal at times, in other instances contrac-
tual incompleteness or lax public monitoring may undermine public 
benefits, resulting in inefficient or unjust outcomes.  In such latter 
cases, the incentives of individual beneficiaries to monitor the new 
regime given their concentrated interest in the public program 
should be facilitated by developing procedural and substantive rights 
aimed at bringing economic and legal reality to terms with the desir-
able social policy. 
III. PRIVATE-COMMON PROPERTY 
Similar to the public-private setting, various forms of mixed pri-
vate-common regimes have emerged over the past few decades.  In-
terestingly, the movement toward such interim regimes is made from 
both poles of the private-common continuum.  In this Part, I analyze 
two prominent case studies, which vary substantially in their historical 
and institutional background and also diverge in the explanation of 
motives for the shift, as well as in their post-transition results.  Never-
theless, both case studies illustrate the potential for mixed regimes to 
better meet current preferences. 
The first case study is the rapidly-growing dominance of Common 
Interest Communities (CICs) at the expense of traditional residential 
neighborhoods.  The second is the recent growth of the semi-
privatized Renewing Kibbutz, alongside the “classic” cooperative Kib-
butz.  This analysis has potential implications that may aid in refram-
ing and reassessing dilemmas regarding other forms of private-
common regimes, including the ever-complicated relationships be-
tween the modern private corporation and its individual stake-
holders. 
A. The Common Interest Community as Residual Claimant 
With more than 286,000 CICs housing fifty-seven million resi-
dents in the U.S. nowadays,94 private developments governed by 
homeowners associations have come to dominate much of the resi-
dential landscape.95  The core of the community property governance 
lies in the conditions, covenants, and restrictions (CC&Rs) included 
in the CIC’s Declaration, which forms a part of the community’s gov-
 94 Community Associations Institution, Data on U.S. Associations, http://www. 
caionline.org/about/facts.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2007). 
 95 For works on the evolution of CICs, see COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: 
PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE COMMON INTEREST (Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. 
Silverman eds., 1994); EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND 
THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS (1994).   
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erning documents.96  As will be shown, these servitudes typically con-
trol and regulate commonly-owned assets and amenities, as well as 
the use of privately-owned housing units.  Beyond these pre-fixed 
provisions, the community-based governance of collective and private 
properties has a dynamic dimension.  This is because the CIC’s insti-
tutions generally have power not only to enforce the terms of the 
Declaration, but also to make managerial decisions, promulgate 
rules, and amend the Declaration without a need for unanimous 
homeowners’ consent.97
The unique property structure of CICs has many facets, not all of 
which will be analyzed elaborately here.  However, one such issue 
arousing substantial interest concerns the nature and extent of the 
powers and practices of CICs vis-à-vis outsiders.  This is especially 
relevant because CICs are often criticized as a “secession of the suc-
cessful,”98 “government for the nice,”99 and so forth, referring to for-
mal and informal exclusionary mechanisms employed by such private 
communities.100
The internal property structure of the CIC, which is the focus of 
this discussion, aims at solving a host of collective action problems 
that neighbors typically face in residential neighborhoods.  These can 
be divided roughly into the (1) establishment and management of 
common amenities, such as streets, parks, and sport facilities, and (2) 
control of intra-neighborhood externalities resulting from the use of 
 96 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT, SERVITUDES]. 
 97 Id. §§ 6.4–6.14. 
 98 Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized Communities and the “Secession of the Successful”: De-
mocracy and Fairness beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1675 (2001). 
 99 Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and its Discontents: Common Interest Communities 
and the Rise of the Government for “The Nice,” 37 URB. LAW. 335 (2005). 
 100 Overt mechanisms may include gates and fences physically isolating the com-
munity.  See EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY G. SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED 
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997).  Formal sorting of community members 
is achieved by associational provisions that set up, for example, age restrictions or 
bans on convicted sex offenders.  See, e.g., Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condo. Ass’n, 81 
Cal. App. 3d. 688 (1978) (upholding an amendment to a condominium bylaw re-
stricting occupancy to persons age eighteen or older); Brett Jackson Coppage, Bal-
ancing Community Interests and Offenders’ Rights: The Validity of Covenants Restricting Sex 
Offenders from Residing in a Neighborhood, 38 URB. LAW. 309 (2006).  Other exclusionary 
measures are informal, operating mainly through the price mechanism, which regu-
larly keeps out low-income families, due both to the typical lack of subsidized afford-
able housing in such projects, and to the significant premium consumers are willing 
to pay for homes in CICs.  Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and 
Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 334 (1998); see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437 (2006) (discussing 
other informal sorting mechanisms). 
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privately-owned units.  The mixed nature of the CIC property regime 
manifests itself, therefore, in the close inter-connectivity between 
group-owned and privately-owned assets within the compounds of the 
CIC, as well as in the extensive group governance of privately-owned 
assets, which typically goes well beyond conventional public govern-
ance of residential private properties. 
1. Controlling Commonly-Owned Assets . . .  
As for the commonly-owned assets, the collective action chal-
lenges which the CIC tackles through the mechanisms of built-in ser-
vitudes and group governance can be divided into two phases, which 
somewhat diverge in their nature. 
The first phase is the efficient creation of community-level 
amenities.101  For some of these assets, such as inner streets, which 
more genuinely possess the economic traits of public goods—
nonexcludability and nonrivalry102—the existence of reciprocal duties 
of contribution solves the inherent market failure that usually neces-
sitates governmental production and financing through imposition of 
taxes.  As for “club goods” such as sport facilities,103 which can be usu-
ally provided by the market in ordinary residential settings, the inter-
nal group provision of such amenities is a significant cost-cutting de-
vice for CIC residents.104
The second phase of collective action in this context concerns 
the on-going maintenance, protection, and improvement of the 
commonly-owned assets.  Here, the contractual contribution mecha-
nisms, together with the association’s regulatory powers over the use 
of these amenities, aim at confronting the “tragic” dynamics of under-
investment and over-use in these resources.105
 101 Such amenities therefore constitute local public goods, the effects of which in-
volve a limited, local geographical area.  See ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN, URBAN ECONOMICS 
457–60 (4th ed. 2000); see also infra note 102 and accompanying text (defining public 
goods). 
 102 Nonexcludability means that there is no feasible way to prevent people from 
enjoying the good even if they refuse to pay for it; nonrivalry means that the mar-
ginal cost of an additional consumer is zero or close to it.  BRUCE, supra note 36, at 
56–57. 
 103 Club goods become congested (hence rival) from a relatively small number of 
users; they are also typically feasibly excludable.  RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, 
THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS AND CLUB GOODS 347–51 (2d ed. 1996). 
 104 Such costs are also influenced by the willingness of the relevant government to 
adjust the CIC members’ public taxes against services provided by the CIC.  Cashin, 
supra note 98, at 1677–78. 
 105 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968); see also Lee 
Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 913–25, 941–52 
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The condition of group-owned assets has obvious implications for 
the “holy grail” of the CIC members’ private interests: their home 
values.  Both assurance of ongoing, stable and cost-saving provision of 
common amenities and protection against intra-neighborhood ex-
ternalities play a major role in protecting and enhancing the home-
owners’ property values.106
2. . . . and Privately-Owned Ones 
The most unique property feature of planned residential com-
munities is probably the extensive group governance of private prop-
erty, which typically comes in addition to, and not in lieu of, the ap-
plicable public regulation, such as land use controls, nuisance law, or 
environmental regulations.  The community provisions may include 
aesthetic controls of the external shape, design, and color of the 
housing units;107 limits or flat prohibitions on the possession of 
pets;108 restrictions on outside storage or display of certain items such 
as unused cars;109 or limits on other types of activities which are not 
regularly prohibited by law.110
These restrictions are designed to combat potential adverse spill-
over effects which do not conform to the community members’ gen-
eral tastes or preferences, hence preventing individual members from 
exercising the effective privilege of use they would have otherwise 
possessed in these attributes of their resources.  The creation of a 
mixed property regime for the use of privately-owned assets is there-
fore not (or at least does not purport to be) detached from the recip-
rocal interests in adjacent privately-owned assets or in the common 
assets.  It is designed to leave to the private owner power over matters, 
the positive and negative effects of which he fully internalizes, but at 
the same time it transfers to the group decision-making powers, 
(2004) [hereinafter Fennell, Tragedies] (offering a good recent analysis of the com-
mons problem). 
 106 In a recent survey, seventy-eight percent of CIC residents said that their CIC’s 
rules “protect and enhance” property values.  Only one percent said these rules 
“harm” property values.  ZOGBY INTERNATIONAL, HOMEOWNERSHIP AND ASSOCIATION 
LIVING: HOA MEMBERS AND HOMEOWNERS NATIONWIDE 21 (2005), http://www.cairf. 
org/research/zogby.pdf. 
 107 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 593–96 (3d ed. 
2005). 
 108 See infra notes 113–116 and accompanying text. 
 109 See, e.g., Shafer v. Bd. of Trs. of Sandy Hook Yacht Club Estates, Inc., 883 P.2d 
1387 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). 
 110 Theoretically, CICs can use the covenant mechanisms also to allow certain ac-
tivities that are otherwise prohibited by law, but this is rarely the case.  ELLICKSON & 
BEEN, supra note 107, at 596. 
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which go substantially beyond the traditional sphere of public inter-
vention in private property and are based on the community’s idio-
syncratic definition of adverse externalities.111
Put differently, the greater the legal latitude granted to CICs in 
controlling and governing private property, the more we can view the 
community as the “residual claimant” to the allegedly private assets.  
Accordingly, the group capture of the rent stemming from various at-
tributes of a certain housing unit enhances the value of other private 
properties.  At least theoretically, this state of affairs aims at having a 
reciprocal nature, making every member of the community better off 
than in a no-group-regulation scenario. 
The residual nature of group control may manifest itself not only 
in awarding the association broad-based discretionary powers over 
matters such as aesthetic approvals,112 but also in the ability of the as-
sociation to change the rules of the game during the lifetime of the 
project, including by promulgation of rules or amendments to the 
Declaration on a non-unanimous basis.  For instance, in Villa De Las 
Palmas Homeowners Ass’n v. Terifaj,113 the California Supreme Court 
upheld a majority-approved amendment to the condominium’s Dec-
laration, imposing a no-pet restriction.  In so doing, the court, view-
ing use restrictions as “crucial to the stable, planned environment of 
any shared ownership arrangement,”114 held that “all homeowners are 
bound by amendments adopted and recorded subsequent to pur-
chase,”115 and that the statutory-based deferential standard according 
to which the covenants and restrictions in the Declaration shall be 
enforceable “unless unreasonable” applies equally to later amend-
 111 The Restatement conceptualizes limits on the use of private property as impos-
ing an “indirect restraint on alienation” of the property, which is valid unless it “lacks 
a rational justification.”  RESTATEMENT, SERVITUDES, supra note 96, § 3.5.  This is dis-
tinguished from “direct restraints,” which include prohibitions or constraints on the 
transfer of land, which are invalid if the restraint is “unreasonable.”  Id. § 3.4.  State 
jurisdictions vary on the subject.  In California, for example, any restraint included in 
a CIC’s Declaration is valid “unless unreasonable.”  CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1354(a) (West 
2005); see also ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 107, at 553–62. 
 112 This does not mean, however, that aesthetic standards can be wholly vague.  See 
Town & Country Estates Ass’n v. Slater, 740 P.2d 668 (Mont. 1987) (striking-down a 
CIC’s aesthetic requirement of “harmony of external design . . . to surrounding 
structures” as too vague).  But cf. Oakbrook Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. Sonnier, 481 So. 2d 
1008 (La. 1986) (upholding a similar covenant). 
 113 90 P.3d 1223 (Cal. 2004). 
 114 Id. at 1228. 
 115 Id. at 1229. 
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ments.116  This approach, which is followed in many other jurisdic-
tions,117 means that even if the original governing documents of the 
CIC leave grey areas allowing individual privileges of use that ad-
versely affect the neighborhood commons, those gaps may be later 
non-unanimously narrowed by the community institutions.118
Such community-wide rules and regulations may be seen as grant-
ing a property rule protection119 against restricted uses in favor of the 
community, or more exactly, in favor of the number of residents 
whose aggregate votes are needed in the association’s decision-
making process to abolish the restriction or to make an exception to 
it (that is, a majority of the association’s board members when the 
change is made through regular rulemaking, or a majority—simple 
or special—of homeowners when an amendment to the Declaration 
is required).120
This property rule protection is, however, problematic from an 
efficiency viewpoint whenever the value that a certain resident attrib-
utes to the enjoined use (e.g., painting the exterior of her house pink 
in an all-white-paint CIC) outweighs the harm expected to other 
community members.  Should the resident try to collect the consent 
needed to overturn the restriction, she is likely to face an anticom-
mons scenario, in view of the fact that the legal power to allow it is 
dispersed among various members.121  The resulting “one-directional 
stickiness in the fragmentation process” creates substantial transac-
tion and strategic costs, which hamper consensual correction of an 
inefficient baseline.122  Although, as mentioned, the governance struc-
 116 Id. at 1232–34.  This means that such amendments to the Declaration are pre-
sumptively valid, and the burden of proving otherwise rests upon the challenging 
homeowner.  Id. 
 117 See, e.g., Riverside Park Condos. Unit Owners Ass’n v. Lucas, 691 N.W.2d 862 
(N.D. 2005). 
 118 One needs, however, to differentiate between amendments to the Declaration 
and rule promulgating.  Rules imposing later use restrictions on private property 
must be “reasonable” to be valid, thus placing the onus of proof on the CIC.  
RESTATEMENT, SERVITUDES, supra note 96, § 6.7. 
 119 Property rule protection means that the entitlement cannot be taken away 
from the party holding it without her consent.  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115–17 (1972). 
 120 See RESTATEMENT, SERVITUDES, supra note 96, § 6.10 (giving a survey of the dif-
ferent types of majorities needed to amend the Declaration). 
 121 This phenomenon is really unsurprising: an antincommons setting of over-
fragmentation of rights often follows an institutional response to a previous com-
mons problem.  Fennell, Tragedies, supra note 105, at 926. 
 122 Francesco Parisi et al., Commons and Anticommons, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 578, 
585–86 (2006). 
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ture of the CIC does not normally require unanimous consent to al-
low such extraordinary use, the process of consent assembly is never-
theless complicated, given also the conservative bias that seems to 
characterize CIC members for undoing restrictions imposed on pri-
vate uses.123
Suggested solutions to such a limited anticommons scenario, 
based also on a switch to a liability rule (monetary compensation) re-
gime, are far from simple.124  One possible way to somewhat mitigate 
the tension between the need to preserve the overall efficient group-
based control of private uses and the fear of case-specific inefficien-
cies may be based on an analogy from cases of deviations from public 
regulation following consent among neighbors.125  Specifically, when-
ever a resident in a CIC is able to demonstrate that her immediate 
neighbors do not oppose the extraordinary use, including following 
contractual side payments, such sub-group consent may serve as a 
prima facie case against the association’s insistence on applying the 
restriction.  In such case, the burden that the restriction is not “un-
reasonable” or “irrational” as applied to the specific tract would be 
passed to the community, which should demonstrate a broader effect 
on the CIC to override the sub-group consent.   Such an adaptation 
of current law may enable CICs to handle some level of heterogeneity 
in tastes and preferences, an issue which is liable to grow in impor-
tance as the number of CICs continues to increase to the point of be-
coming the default in designing new residential neighborhoods. 
B. The Renewing Kibbutz: Mixed Ideology, Mixed Property 
The Israeli cooperative Kibbutz is often considered the quintes-
sential example of a long-enduring form of secular intentional com-
munity maintaining a pure common property regime.126  Originating 
in 1910, the agriculture-based Kibbutzim played a major role during 
 123 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 124 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1464–68 
(2005) (suggesting seting up a “callable call” option regime between the homeowner 
and the community, which would be based on a periodic self-assessment by the 
homeowner of the use’s value, but admitting that this mechanism may be prone to 
problems of complexity and strategic evaluations). 
 125 See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 107, at 393–400 (discussing neighbors’ con-
sent requirement in some jurisdictions to allow for certain extraordinary uses which 
do not conform to the zoning ordinance); id. at 534 (discussing neighbors bargain-
ing around nuisance law rules). 
 126 This is unlike other types of secular communities that have been generally 
short-lasting; communities with religious intentions tend to fare better.  See Robert C. 
Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE 
L. J. 226, 271–76 (2006). 
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the formative years before and after the 1948 establishment of the 
State of Israel, and were viewed by Israeli leadership as realizing the 
ultimate Zionist ideal.127  A cooperative association, the Kibbutz is 
formally defined as a “settlement which is based on the ideas of col-
lective ownership, self-work, and equal sharing in production, con-
sumption, and education.”128  The communal and egalitarian nature 
of the Kibbutz manifested itself in all areas of life, originally imple-
menting a socialist ideology that attributed a central distinctive qual-
ity to the collective enterprise going beyond—and often at the ex-
pense of—satisfying individual preferences and interests.129  The 
cooperative regime has been enforced through various mechanisms 
of social control, including substantial limits on entry to and exit 
from membership in the Kibbutz’s association,130 as well as other 
types of formal and informal norms.131
The Kibbutz movement is currently in the midst of a process of 
dramatic change, leading to the evolution of a new type of Kibbutz, 
now formally known as the “Renewing Kibbutz,” alongside the old-
style cooperative Kibbutz.132  The Renewing Kibbutz started out as a 
spontaneous, informal phenomenon in numerous cooperative Kib-
butzim as of the 1980s in response to an on-going crisis.133  Prominent 
among the economic and political causes for this crisis were the sharp 
decline in the profitability of agriculture; internal mismanagement 
which brought many Kibbutzim to insolvency; loss of governmental 
favoritism with the rise to power of the right-wing laissez-faire-
 127 See generally HENRY NEAR, 2 THE KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT: A HISTORY (1997). 
 128 Cooperative Associations Ordinances (Types of Associations), § 2(5)(a), 1995, 
KT 5722, 246 [hereinafter Types of Associations]. 
 129 See YONINA TALMON, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY IN THE KIBBUTZ 207–08 (1972). 
 130 Israeli courts have rarely interfered with membership decisions made by Kib-
butzim, including decisions to remove members, in view of these cooperative associa-
tions’ allegedly voluntary nature and the judicially-recognized importance of main-
taining social harmony and collective discipline.  See, e.g., HCJ 4222/95 Palatin v. 
Registrar of Coop. Ass’ns [1998], IsrSC 52(5) 614, 620; CA 8398/00 Katz v. Kibbutz 
Ein-Tzurim [2002], IsrSC 56(6) 602, 623. 
 131 See TALMON, supra note 129, at 2–3.  The Kibbutz is a classic example of what 
Robert Ellickson has termed a “close-knit group,” that is, a “social network whose 
members have credible and reciprocal prospects for the application of power against 
one another and a good supply of information on past and present internal events.”  
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 177–83 
(1991).  This allowed the Kibbutz members to engage in a complex network of in-
formal norms, which helped to enforce the group’s formal rules. 
 132 Amnon Lehavi, New Residential Communities in Israel: Between Privatization and 
Exclusion, 2 HAIFA L. REV. 63, 78–89 (2005) (Hebrew). 
 133 See Public Committee on Kibbutzim, A Report on the Kibbutzim 24–39 (Aug. 
2003), available at http://www.globes.co.il/serve/nadlan/tikunim/kibiz.doc (He-
brew). 
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oriented Likud party in the late 1970s; and real estate pressures fol-
lowing the rise in demand for land for residential and commercial 
developments, especially affecting Kibbutzim located at the urban 
fringe.134  But not less important were socio-ideological factors: the 
demise in the fundamental socialist ethos among younger genera-
tions; an internal tension due to the growing gaps in productivity 
among various members (especially after many turned to non-
agricultural pursuits outside the Kibbutz, but had to keep passing on 
their salaries to the collective coffer); and the desire of many middle-
age members to bequeath assets to their children in an era of eco-
nomic uncertainty.135  This led to substantial rates of member with-
drawal and mounting pressures for change.136
As a result, numerous Kibbutzim started to carry out grassroots 
organizational reforms, including setting up a differential personal 
budget system; partial privatization of certain services such as health, 
education, and meals; allocation of individual shares in the Kibbutz’s 
productive assets; and the taking of initial steps to change the Kib-
butz’s land tenure system.137  These spontaneous changes raised sub-
stantial difficulties not only because they were not formally approved 
beforehand by the Kibbutzim’s national organizations, but also be-
cause they allegedly conflicted with the formal definition of the Kib-
butz in various statutes, ordinances, and agreements made with gov-
ernmental and other public entities.138
To resolve the issue, the Israeli Cabinet appointed a public com-
mittee which was asked to review these de facto changes and to offer 
a new formal policy.139  In 2004, the Cabinet approved the commit-
tee’s recommendations, which largely validated the grassroots modes 
of change.140  Consequently, the applicable legislation and adminis-
trative ordinances were amended to formally incorporate the Renew-
ing Kibbutz as a new type of a cooperative association, alongside the 
cooperative Kibbutz.141  Currently, about two-thirds of Israel’s 266 
 134 Lehavi, supra note 132, at 78–80.  
 135 A Report on the Kibbutzim , supra note 133, at 24–25. 
 136 See generally ELIEZER BEN-REPHAEL, CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION: THE KIBBUTZ AT 
THE CENTURY’S END (1997); CRISIS IN THE ISRAELI KIBBUTZ: MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF 
CHANGING TIMES (Uriel Levithan et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter CRISIS].  
 137 A Report on the Kibbutzim, supra note 133, at 28–33 (discussing these changes 
and their implications) 
 138 Id. at 33–37. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 5–10.  The Cabinet approved the recommendations in Decision no. 1736 
on March 28, 2004.  Id. 
 141 The definition of the Renewing Kibbutz is now included in the Cooperative 
Associations Ordinances.  Types of Associations, supra note 128, § 2(5)(b). 
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Kibbutzim generally conform to the definition of a Renewing Kib-
butz.142
The Renewing Kibbutz is characterized by one or more of the fol-
lowing mixed property features, which reflect its updated, mixed-type 
normative stance: 
First, the Renewing Kibbutz may allocate individual budgets to its 
members pursuant to the “extent of their contribution, positions, and 
[time-based] seniority.”143  This flexible provision, aimed at motivat-
ing individual productivity, is subject to the duty of the Kibbutz to 
maintain a mechanism of “reciprocal guarantee” in the allocation of 
funds, ensuring a minimal economic safety net for all members and 
providing for the needs of the elderly and the disabled.144  This mixed 
regime may be seen therefore as shaping rules of allocation combin-
ing a “desert” principle, which is characteristic of utilitarian-based 
groups alongside a “need” criterion, typical of groups with high inter-
personal solidarity,145 hence maintaining the socialist ideology at 
midway.  This compromise is, however, far from easy.  Even with the 
modifying redistributive mechanisms intact, the budget gaps can still 
be extremely large within a single Kibbutz, creating new causes for in-
ternal tension.146  This departure from the egalitarian principle of the 
cooperative Kibbutz may therefore also have obvious implications on 
the communality and solidarity in the life of the Kibbutz, raising 
doubts about the long-term viability of this version of mixed house-
hold management.147
Second, the Renewing Kibbutz is entitled to privatize its housing 
units.  To briefly explain, the tenure system in agricultural lands in 
Israel is one of public leasehold.148  The lands, managed by Israel 
 142 See KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT YEARBOOK NO. 3, 45–48 (2006), available at 
http://www.kibbutz.org.il/calcala/shnaton/060628_shnaton_2006.pdf (Hebrew). 
 143 Types of Associations, supra note 128, § 2(5)(b)(1). 
 144 Cooperative Associations Ordinances (Reciprocal Guarantee in a Renewing 
Kibbutz), 2005, KT 6445, 190. 
 145 See DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 25–32 (2001). 
 146 See Amiran Cohen & Eli Ashkenazi, Kibbutz Wage Gaps as High as 700 Percent, 
HAARETZ.COM (Eng. ed.), Oct. 25, 2004. 
 147 See, e.g., Eli Ashkenazi, Kibbutzim Worried about Disabled Members, HAARETZ (Eng. 
Online ed.), Jan. 15, 2006; Eli Ashkenazi, To be or not to be Cooperative, Kibbutz Move-
ment Wonders, HAARETZ.COM (Eng. ed.) May 18, 2006. 
 148 Before the establishment of the State of Israel, Jews acquired lands mainly 
through philanthropic and private corporations.  See generally Ruth Kark, Planning, 
Housing, and Land Policy 1948-1952: The Formation of Concepts and Governmental Frame-
works, in ISRAEL—THE FIRST DECADE OF INDEPENDENCE 461–94  (Ian Troen & Noah Lu-
cas eds., 1995) (giving a history of the formation of Israel Lands).  Most prominent 
was the Jewish National Fund (JNF), established in 1901.  Id.  Up until 1948, the JNF 
acquired approximately 933,000 dunams (230,000 acres), with the intention that the 
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Lands Administration (ILA),149 are leased for renewable short-term 
periods (typically three years each), and the use by the lessee is gen-
erally restricted to agriculture and accompanying housing.150  The 
cooperative Kibbutz has traditionally entered such short-term renew-
able agreements with the ILA.  Because of the collective nature of the 
Kibbutz, the various members were purposely not a part of the lease 
agreement, and had no individual rights in the land whatsoever, in-
cluding in the housing units provided by the Kibbutz.151  Any conver-
sion of the short-term collective leases into a series of long-term indi-
vidually-based ones therefore necessitates consent by the public 
landowner, alongside an internal restructuring in the Kibbutz. 
The ILA gave its initial consent for such a transition, according to 
which individual leases would be entered for the various housing 
units, whereas the rest of the Kibbutz’s area would continue to be 
leased collectively.152  However, this 1996 decision had little practical 
effect, not only because it preceded the formal redefinition of the 
Kibbutz, but also because it set up substantial capitalization fees (i.e., 
an up-front payment for the entire lease period), which proved sim-
land would stay under the Jewish People’s common ownership in perpetuity, and 
that land would be leased to Jewish settlers for a period of forty-nine years.  Id.  After 
1948, the Israeli government took various steps to nationalize lands, with the similar 
intent that State land would not be sold, but only leased—a notion formally en-
trenched in the Basic Law: Israel Lands, 1960, S.H. 56.  Id.  Currently, ninety-three 
percent of the entire land in Israel, and nearly 100 percent of agricultural lands, is 
owned by either the State, the Development Authority (a State-held statutory entity), 
or the JNF.  Id.  These lands are defined collectively as “Israel Lands.”  Id. 
 149 The ILA is the administrative agency charged with managing all Israel Lands, 
including those owned by JNF.  Israel Lands Administration Law, 1960, S.H. 57. 
 150 Contrarily, state-held urban lands are leased for long periods, most leases be-
ing in the form of a “capitalized leasing,” meaning that the lessee pays a single, up-
front payment for the entire period.  See Gilat Benchetrit & Daniel Czamanski, The 
Gradual Abolition of the Public Leasehold System in Israel and Canberra: What Lessons Can be 
Learned?, 21 LAND USE POL’Y 45 (2004).  In 2005, the Israeli Cabinet approved the 
recommendations of a public committee to transfer full ownership in urban lands to 
the lessees for an additional, relatively small payment.  See Tzally Greenberg, PM 
Okays Reform to Public Real Estate Sector, HAARETZ.COM (Eng. ed.), May 17, 2005. 
 151 Kibbutzim that were set up prior to 1948 had originally signed collective leases 
with JNF for a period of 49 years.  GIDEON VITKON, ISRAEL LANDS 
ADMINSITRATION LAW 919–26 (2004) (Hebrew).  After the establishment of the 
State of Israel and the formation of ILA, the Kibbutzim entered collective short-term 
agreements with ILA.  Id. at 927–35  Those agreements are either bilateral, in which 
the Kibbutz is the lessee, or trilateral, in which the Jewish Agency (a nongovernmen-
tal development agency established in 1929) is the lessee, and the Kibbutz is the 
holder of merely a permit to occupy and use the land for agriculture.  Id. at 971–95  
Under each scenario, the individual Kibbutz members had no formal rights in the 
land.  Id. at 1129–31 
 152 Israel Lands Council, Decision No. 751 (Feb. 27, 1996), available at http:// 
www.mmi.gov.il (Hebrew). 
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ply too high for most Kibbutzim members.  In 2005, the Cabinet ap-
proved the recommendations of yet another public committee ap-
pointed to review the issue.153  According to the new policy—recently 
implemented through corresponding decisions by the ILA—each 
family would be allocated one housing unit for a capitalization fee of 
3.75 percent of the tract’s market value.154
As far as the internal regime is concerned, the Renewing Kibbutz 
may allocate the housing units based on “egalitarian criterions, con-
sidering the member’s seniority.”155 To preserve its revised version of 
communitarianism and group solidarity, the Renewing Kibbutz is re-
quired to set-up direct restraints on further alienation of the housing 
units.  This means that the Renewing Kibbutz must make a provision 
in its by-laws for housing units to be transferred only to members in 
the Kibbutz’s cooperative association, or at the least, that at any given 
point in time, more than half of the housing units in the Kibbutz will 
belong to such full-fledged members.156  Moreover, in the event of 
such transfer, the Kibbutz itself has a right of first refusal to purchase 
the housing unit at its market price.157
Third, the Renewing Kibbutz is entitled to allocate individual 
shares in the Kibbutz’s productive assets, provided that the individual 
members will not be able to jointly gain corporate control of any spe-
cific enterprise (meaning, typically, that the Kibbutz will retain more 
than fifty percent of the shares).158  The allocation of shares will be 
 153 See Report of the Committee for the Review of Rights in Residential Areas in 
Agricultural Settlements (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.mof.gov.il/karka2005-
12.htm (Hebrew). 
 154 Israel Lands Council, Decision No. 979 (Mar. 27, 2007); Israel Lands Council,  
Decision No. 1101 (Mar. 27, 2007).  However, should the family wish to receive the 
full development rights (current and future) for the tract, it would have to pay an 
additional sum to ILA, equal to 29.25% of the land’s full market value.  Israel Lands 
Council, Decision No. 979 §§ 4.7–4.8.  This new policy is a source of public contro-
versy, with some advocacy groups protesting what they deem to be an undeserved 
governmental giving of state-owned lands (one of which submitted a petition to the 
Supreme Court of Israel in the matter in July 2007), and Kibbutzim and Moshavim 
on their part disputing the additional 29.25% payment.  Amiram Cohen & Anat 
Georgy, ILA Reinstates Land Discount for Kibbutz, Moshav Veterans, HAARETZ.COM (Eng. 
ed.), Jan. 12, 2006. 
 155 Cooperative Associations Ordinances (Affiliation of Housing Units in a Renew-
ing Kibbutz), § 3, 2005, KT 6445, 195. 
 156 The residents who are not Kibbutz members must become members in a 
broader-based “cooperative association for community settlement” with its own 
screening process.  Id. §§ 6–8. 
 157 Id. § 9. 
 158 Cooperative Associations Ordinances (Affiliation of Productive Assets in a Re-
newing Kibbutz), 2005, KT 6445, 195.  The ordinances refer to the definition of the 
term “control” in Securities Law, § 1, 1968, S.H. 541, 234, which creates a presump-
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made by applying “egalitarian criterions and in equal manner, con-
sidering the member’s seniority.”159 The Kibbutz may also set caps on 
the overall holding of individual members following subsequent 
transfers, as well as a right of first refusal in favor of the Kibbutz in 
case of such transfer.160
The Renewing Kibbutz faces considerable challenges in its transi-
tion from a regime of comprehensive communitarianism and egali-
tarianism into a structure driven by a mixed ideology, and translated 
into a mixed property arrangement. 
To compare, in CICs, group ownership and governance of private 
property is a mere instrumentality based on the insights that there 
are diverging optimal scales governing different assets and uses in a 
residential neighborhood,161 and that the value and enjoyment of pri-
vate assets is largely influenced by a complicated web of neighbor-
hood-level concerns including group composition, intra-
neighborhood externalities, and other types of collective action di-
lemmas.  In this respect, CICs have been able to reach a stable equi-
librium in designing the property mix, even if at the risk of occa-
sional rigidity.  In contrast, in the Renewing Kibbutz, group control is 
still a constitutive intrinsic value, even in its moderate current version.  
The attempt to combine an incentive structure for individual produc-
tivity alongside substantial levels of egalitarianism, communality, and 
a core of collective ownership as a built-in constraint per se has yet to 
be attained.  This is mainly because one of the linchpins of the coop-
erative Kibbutz, namely, the assumption that collectivism need not 
necessarily come at the expense of efficiency and productivity, may 
have been valid for an agriculture-based society that was able to shut 
itself off from external pressures, but has been largely undermined 
with the changes in endogenous and exogenous circumstances.162
Moreover, the on-going commitment to collectivism, which ap-
plies to all aspects of life, including the household management, dif-
tion of control in a corporation when a stakeholder has more than fifty percent of 
the voting rights or has the power to appoint more than fifty percent of the board’s 
directors. 
 159 Cooperative Associations Ordinances (Affiliation of Productive Assets in a Re-
newing Kibbutz), 2005, KT 6445, 195. 
 160 Id. at 6. 
 161 See infra notes 337–39 and accompanying text. 
 162 As Robert Ellickson predicts, in order to survive, a commune “must maintain 
homogeneity of interests, establish systematic internal social controls, and stem exo-
dus by controlling information about the outside world and penalizing those who 
leave.”  Ellickson, supra note 25, at 1361.  With the decay of such elements in the 
Kibbutz, came also a decline in productivity because of internal free-riding and a 
“brain drain” of productive members.  See CRISIS, supra note 136, at 160–61. 
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ferentiates the Renewing Kibbutz from yet other types of regimes of 
common property, such as traditional forms of group management of 
natural resources, which are largely driven by considerations of opti-
mal scale and other instrumental benefits.163  Thus, while the process 
of change seems to abide by Demsetz’s evolutionary theory of prop-
erty, it remains to be seen whether the Renewing Kibbutz would be 
able to contest Demsetz’s normative bias in favor of private prop-
erty,164 and to position itself in a stable, distinctive point along the pri-
vate-common continuum, delineated as follows: 
Renewing 
Kibbutz 
traditional com-
mon property 
regimes  (fisher-
ies, etc.)  
Common In-
terest Com-
munities 
commercial 
corporations 
private prop-
erty + stan-
dard public 
regulation
cooperative 
Kibbutz / 
religious 
communes 
Private          Common 
Chart 2 
The Private-Common Continuum 
 
IV. PUBLIC-COMMON PROPERTY 
Beyond the Public-Private Partnerships discussed in Part II, the 
shift in the reality of public provision of goods and services takes 
place in many other ways, both formal and informal.  These various 
forms have received scant academic attention, with little attempt to 
conceptualize them and to place them within the broader framework 
of property regimes.165  In this part, I analyze mixed-in-fact property 
regimes, which I entitle “public commons,” following an examination 
of urban local public spaces, such as parks, playgrounds, and squares, 
the production and management of which combine elements of both 
 163 See OSTROM, supra note 1, at 58–181 (offering a comprehensive analysis of such 
actual regimes). 
 164 See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 165 There are a few exceptions to this, although in most cases the analysis of such 
property forms as hybrids is quite implicit.  See, e.g., COLE, supra note 4, at 126–28 
(discussing a quasi-governmental organization called English Nature, which created 
a kind of commons to protect the chalk cliff and seashore area of England’s Thanet 
Coast in accordance with the European Union legal requirements and British do-
mestic policy); OSTROM, supra note 1, at 90, 101–02 (discussing “nested enterprises” 
in which local commons may be nested within larger governmental systems). 
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“public” and “common.”166  Although the various “public commons” 
along the spectrum—which I will delineate in the context of public 
spaces in New York City—diverge from one another in their unique 
mixtures of “public” and “common” elements, they do share broader 
conceptual and normative aspects.167
Whereas the public spaces surveyed are formally owned by the 
government (usually a city), many are allocated and are regularly op-
erated and maintained in contextual, complicated manners.  Of spe-
cific interest are the various forms of involvement of the local group 
of users, which is typically comprised of geographically adjacent resi-
dents or businesses.  In some cases, the local group of users is for-
mally organized and is a counterpart to an explicit role allocation vis-
à-vis the government.  In other cases, the local involvement is largely 
informal yet may be persistent and highly significant in the on-going 
life of the public space.168
This phenomenon is far from being anecdotal both in terms of its 
scope and of its implications.  The level and nature of local involve-
ment may in many cases determine the fate of the resource.  Long-
enduring cooperation between local users and between the group 
and the government is often essential to making a publicly-owned 
space successful, endowing significant direct benefits and positive 
spillovers.  On the contrary, under-investment and neglect by the lo-
cal users may have the opposite effect of securing resources with net 
negative value. 
 166 In an earlier work, I identified and analyzed a phenomenon of grassroots, local 
group cooperation that has brought back many public spaces throughout the coun-
try from being sites of dereliction, neglect, and crime into centers of thriving local 
activity and a source of pride for residents.  Amnon Lehavi, Property Rights and Local 
Public Goods: Toward a Better Future for Urban Communities, 36 URB. LAW. 1 (2004) 
[hereinafter Lehavi, Property Rights].  I focused mainly on informal patterns of such 
activities that have often been able to grow and stabilize over time, and I pointed to 
the promises and challenges of this phenomenon.  See generally id.  In this Article, I 
extend this discussion to offer a fuller taxonomy of the range of formal and informal 
“public commons.” 
 167 Although I focus on the urban setting, such phenomena exist also in suburban 
and rural areas.  See, e.g., BRIAN DONAHUE, RECLAIMING THE COMMONS: COMMUNITY 
FARMS AND FORESTS IN A NEW ENGLAND TOWN (1999) (describing the establishment of 
a non-profit community-based farm on town-owned land in Weston, Massachusetts, 
devoted to environmental and social goals). 
 168 The reality of “public commons” exceeds public spaces.  One better-known ex-
ample is the Community Development Corporation (CDC).  CDCs are multi-purpose 
community-controlled corporations that work to develop and improve an area 
through provision of affordable housing, social services, job training, etc.  See PAUL S. 
GROGAN & TONY PROSCIO, COMEBACK CITIES: A BLUEPRINT FOR URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD 
REVIVAL 65–101 (2000); AVIS C. VIDAL, REBUILDING COMMUNITIES: A NATIONAL STUDY 
OF URBAN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 33–84 (1992). 
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This mixed socio-economic reality is not, however, accompanied 
by an adequate legal regime that looks beyond the formal ownership 
of the government.  Specifically, in cases involving explicit coopera-
tion, the interests of the local group may be protected by contract, 
whereas more informal patterns of group management do not enjoy 
legal validation corresponding to the parties’ actual form of engage-
ment in the resource.  In such cases, the community has to rely on 
more general doctrines, such as the law of dedication or the public 
trust doctrine, which at times may under-protect the group, and at 
other times may over-protect it.  This state of affairs stresses the need 
for an updated legal regime that would fully consider the current 
landscape of public-common mixtures and would provide the proper 
incentives for successful resource provision and management.  Such a 
regime would, in appropriate cases, validate what are currently infor-
mal types of “public commons.” 
A. The “Public” in Local Public Spaces 
As discussed in the context of CICs, local public goods that do not 
possess pure public good traits—meaning that they are subject to 
problems of congestion and rising marginal costs from a given num-
ber of users, and that non-members can be effectively excluded from 
them—may be generally produced by private firms or institutions.169  
This group of club goods also consists of spaces and amenities such as 
parks, playgrounds, squares, and sport facilities, which are regularly 
produced not only in planned communities, but also in ordinary ur-
ban settings.  Private clubs provide sport facilities (gyms, swimming 
pools, etc.), whereas shopping malls typically include wide spaces, 
green areas, and play areas. 
Governmentally owned public spaces still comprise, however, a 
major part of such spaces in cities. New York City has over 1,700 pub-
lic spaces and recreational facilities.170  Other major cities also typi-
cally own hundreds of such amenities.171  This is not due merely to 
the history of government default provision in the pre-CIC or pre-
shopping-mall era.  Today, cities continue to establish new public 
spaces, even when they are subject to budgetary constraints, and of-
ten subsequently fail to properly maintain them.172  In an era of priva-
 169 See supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text. 
 170 See New York City Department of Parks and Recreation Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, http://www.nycgovparks.org/sub_faqs/park_faqs.html#g1 (last visited Feb. 1, 
2007). 
 171 See Lehavi, Property Rights, supra note 166, at 29–30 (setting forth representative 
figures). 
 172 Id. at 31–33. 
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tization of the public realm, there still exist several reasons for main-
taining a substantial public property layer in such resources. 
1. Positive Externalities 
One justification for governmental provision of public spaces 
concerns non-use values and other types of positive externalities.  
Public spaces provide direct benefits for people who visit and use 
them, such as enjoyment of recreational activities, improved personal 
health, and child skill development.173  A private supplier can inter-
nalize benefits that it provides to users by charging membership or 
user fees.174  However, successful public spaces may often entail sig-
nificant advantages for residents who do not actively use them.  Posi-
tive spillover effects stemming from a public space typically include 
an increase in adjacent real estate prices175 and a boost to economic 
and commercial activity.176  Here, the private provider has no appar-
ent mechanism to collect on these benefits.  Courts generally have 
been reluctant to hold a neighbor liable in restitution following a self-
serving activity by a landowner that incidentally improves the 
neighbor’s land, even when the benefit is readily translatable to 
monetary gain.177  Transaction and strategic costs may also hamper 
the possibility of a comprehensive, contractually-based contribution 
by neighboring beneficiaries, leading again to the fear of sub-optimal 
 173 See SUSAN G. SOLOMON, AMERICAN PLAYGROUNDS: REVITALIZING COMMUNITY 
SPACE 209–11 (2005) (discussing the benefits of playgrounds, promoting child devel-
opment and health); Lawrence D. Frank & Peter Engelke, How Land Use and Trans-
portation Systems Impact Public Health (ACES: Active Community Environment Initia-
tive Working Paper No. 1) 12–13, 37–40, available at http://www.cdc.gov 
/nccdphp/dnpa/pdf/aces-workingpaper1.pdf (last viewed on Feb. 1, 2007) (discuss-
ing the links between public health, physical activity, and urban space design). 
 174 Numerous methods have been offered to measure the private demand for re-
sources such as public spaces.  See, e.g., ROBERT C. MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, 
USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 78–79 
(1989). 
 175 There is a host of empirical evidence indicating a positive link between suc-
cessful (i.e., safe, well-maintained) urban public parks and other open spaces and 
adjacent real estate prices.  See, e.g., Molly Epsey & Kwame Owuso-Edusei, Neighbor-
hood Parks and Residential Property Values in Greenville, South Carolina, 33 J. AGRIC. & 
APPLIED ECON. 487 (2001); D.W. Hobden et al., Green Space Borders—A Tangible Bene-
fit? Evidence from Four Neighborhoods in Surrey, British Columbia, 1980–2001, 21 LAND USE 
POL’Y 129 (2004); Vicki Been & Ioan Voicu, The Effect of Community Gardens on 
Neighboring Property Values (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 46, Mar. 2006), 
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/papers/46. 
 176 The Trust for Public Land, Benefits of Urban Open Space, http://www.tpl.org 
/tier3_cdl.cfm?content_item_id=1242&folder_id=905 (last visited Feb. 1, 2007). 
 177 See, e.g., Ulmer v. Farnsworth, 15 A. 65 (Me. 1888); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 cmt. e, illus. 4 (Discussion Draft 
2000). 
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provision when the provider’s use-based revenues are insufficient.  
Contrarily, a local government whose public spaces confer such de-
rivative benefits could capture a portion of them through increased 
revenues from property taxes, taxes related to economic activity (such 
as sales taxes), or by initially imposing project-specific special assess-
ments on neighboring properties.178
In a few cases, the very existence of a certain public space that is 
located in a unique natural surrounding or that has an outstanding 
aesthetic or historical value may provide additional forms of non-use 
values that affect much larger, dispersed communities.179  Put differ-
ently, such non-use benefits constitute public goods that may necessi-
tate some type of pubic intervention to improve the chances for an 
efficient level of provision. 
2. Egalitarianism 
A second argument in favor of governmental provision of public 
spaces is the promotion of equity between citizens of different socio-
economic classes.  Nineteenth century-based urban parks—Frederic 
Law Olmsted’s Central Park being a notable example—were in-
tended to serve as a melting pot for different classes of people that 
lived in close proximity and as an arena for socializing poor immi-
grants into the values of the gentry.180  Somewhat differently, public 
spaces (playgrounds in particular) designed during the Reform Era 
were a form of social control aimed at developing a specific set of 
values in the poor and immigrant urban residents.181  Despite the 
decay of such indoctrination and paternalism over time,182 public 
parks seem to continue to be generally viewed as an appropriate 
object of “specific egalitarianism”—the provision of a baseline level of 
benefits that every individual should enjoy as a matter of social 
policy.183
 178 Interestingly, when the derivative benefits of the public space expand beyond 
municipal borders, and in the absence of an intergovernmental contribution 
mechanism, the fear of sub-optimal provision could re-emerge.  See Amnon Lehavi, 
Intergovernmental Liability Rules, 92 VA. L. REV. 929, 984–87 (2006). 
 179 See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The “Conservation Game”: The Possibility of Volun-
tary Cooperation in Preserving Buildings of Cultural Importance, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
733, 747–49 (1997) (offering a taxonomy of such non-use values). 
 180 FREDERIC LAW OLMSTED, PUBLIC PARKS AND THE ENLARGEMENT OF TOWNS (1870), 
reprinted in THE CITY READER 302, 306–07 (Richard L. Gates & Frederic Stout eds., 3d 
ed. 2003). 
 181 GALEN CRANZ, THE POLITICS OF PARK DESIGN: A HISTORY OF URBAN PARKS IN 
AMERICA 61–84 (1982). 
 182 Id. at 101. 
 183 James Tobin, On Limiting the Domain of Inequality, 13 J.L. & ECON. 263, 264 
(1970). 
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Although egalitarianism could theoretically be achieved by means 
that avoid governmental ownership, such as by subsidies or incentives 
to private suppliers,184 empirical evidence points to very limited suc-
cess.  One example is New York City’s “privately owned public 
spaces,” amenities for the public required from a developer in return 
for other zoning variances, such as floor area ratio bonuses.185  Be-
cause these spaces must maintain an “essential nexus” that physically 
connects them with the particular commercial development,186 they 
are densely concentrated in commercial hubs, while almost non-
existent in other areas.  Accordingly, out of the 503 privately owned 
public spaces, 496 are located in Manhattan and only seven in the 
other four boroughs.187
This is definitely not to say that governmental provision of public 
spaces adequately achieves the goal of social egalitarianism.  Anecdo-
tal evidence indicates that municipal public parks are predominately 
developed in white, affluent neighborhoods.188  Formal public owner-
ship of public spaces does, however, maintain at least the possibility 
of public law accountability, including equal protection litigation, 
even though its success has been modest in this context.189
3. Publicness and Democracy 
A related argument in favor of governmental ownership concerns 
publicness and democracy.  Utilization of public spaces as centers for 
urban public life in Western culture dates back at least to the times of 
 184 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 87 (6th ed. 2003). 
 185 The 1961 Zoning Resolution in New York City, which regulates the provision of 
privately owned public spaces, explicitly requires that these spaces be kept open to 
the public.  JEROLD S. KAYDEN ET AL., PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE: THE NEW YORK 
CITY EXPERIENCE 38 (2000). 
 186 Cf. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987) (requiring 
such mandated contribution to the public be “reasonably related to the public need 
or burden that the [project] creates or to which it contributes.”). 
 187 KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 185, at 297. 
 188 Michael Gelboter, The Meaning of Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 841, 853–54 (1994); Jane E. Schukoske, Community Development Through Garden-
ing: State and Local Policies Transforming Urban Open Space, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 351, 357–59 (2000). 
 189 See supra note 82 (discussing equal protection litigation on municipal services 
in general).  In Beal v. Lindsay, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit denied relief to black and Puerto Rican residents living in the neighborhood 
of Crotona Park who alleged that New York City had unconstitutionally discriminated 
against them by failing to maintain the Park in a condition equivalent to that of 
other parks in the Bronx.  468 F.2d 287, 288–89, 290–91 (2d Cir. 1972).  The court 
found that “the City ha[d] satisfied its constitutional obligations by equal input even 
though, because of conditions for which it is not responsible [e.g., vandalism], it 
ha[d] not achieved the equal results it desire[d].”  Id. at 290–91. 
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the Greek Agora and the Roman Forum.190  These centers served as a 
meeting place for citizens, in which they handled their common 
affairs, traded goods, enjoyed dances and games, and exchanged 
news and opinions.191  In the New World, settlements and towns were 
designed around a central public square.192  In the English Northeast 
towns, the central Common served governmental functions alongside 
public life functions, (for example, providing a place to conduct 
militia drills as well as allowing for the citizenry to assemble), as well 
as private functions, such as the grazing of cattle.193  Even with the 
changes in the conceptualization and design of public spaces during 
later times,194 these resources maintained their basic characters not 
only as places designated to host the diverse general public, but also 
as forums for embedding civic-democratic functions and values.195
A legal manifestation of the vision of public spaces as promoting 
notions of publicness and democracy is found in the “public forum” 
doctrine, conceived of in the context of the First Amendment Free 
Speech Clause.196  Within the delineation of the various types of pub-
lic properties for the purpose of reviewing the constitutionality of re-
strictions imposed on individual and group expressive activities, pub-
lic spaces such as parks and streets are considered the most 
quintessential public fora that “have immemorially been held in trust 
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions.”197
 190 LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS TRANSFORMATION, AND 
ITS PROSPECTS 149 (1961). 
 191 Id. at 149–50. 
 192 This was also the case with towns established by the Spaniards, in which the 
main plaza was used as a marketplace as well as for other purposes such as celebra-
tions, tournaments and bullfights.  JOHN W. REPS, THE MAKING OF URBAN AMERICA 29–
30 (1965); MARK GIROUARD, CITIES AND PEOPLE: A SOCIAL AND ARCHITECTURAL HISTORY 
233–36 (1985). 
 193 While in most cities, such as New Haven, Connecticut and Boston, Massachu-
setts, the Common was designed as a central square, in others, such as in Sharon, 
Connecticut, the Common was actually a 150 to 200-foot wide strip running through 
the entire length of the town.  MUMFORD, supra note 190, at 133. 
 194 See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text; CRANZ, supra note 181 (offering 
a comprehensive review of the different phases of American public parks). 
 195 FRUG, supra note 54, at 60–61. 
 196 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2. 
 197 See Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 
(quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)); Horton v. City of St. Augustine, 
272 F.3d 1318, 1333–35 (11th Cir. 2001) (offering a recent analysis of the “public fo-
rum” spectrum). 
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Two interrelated developments seem, however, to undermine the 
practical ability of governmentally-owned public spaces to promote 
the values of publicness and democracy, but at the same time stress 
the inherent problems with private alternatives.  On the one hand, 
many traditional centers and other public spaces in cities have been 
gradually appropriated by drug dealers, homeless people and so 
forth, driving away other citizens.  This trend has been exacerbated 
by judicial prohibitions of certain types of law and order measures 
such as anti-loitering legislation, which is considered to unduly limit 
civil liberties.198  On the other hand, the “legitimate” public has found 
shopping malls and other privately-owned spaces as places where so-
ciability, civility, and commerce can once again flourish in an atmos-
phere of safety and security.199  To achieve that purpose, these pri-
vately owned spaces exercise different forms of formal and informal 
regulation on functions, activities, and admittance.200  Although 
courts have intervened in some cases of exclusionary regulation,201 
most types of such regulation seem to remain intact.202
These two trends have been portrayed as creating a divide be-
tween the concepts of “community” and “public.”203  Whereas the lat-
ter notion entails confrontation with difference, heterogeneity, and 
randomness, “community” emphasizes familiarity, security, control, 
and a conformist identity that smoothes over differences.204  Conse-
quently, “community” emphasizes exclusion of those who simply do 
not “fit in.”205  Hence, to the extent that one views at least some de-
 198 See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 45–46, 64  (1991) (striking down as uncon-
stitutionally vague a city ordinance barring “criminal street gang members from loi-
tering with one another or with other persons” in public spaces).  There is consider-
able debate among property scholars about public space law and order programs.  
Compare Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhan-
dlers, Skid Rows and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996), with Richard C. 
Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371 (2001), and Nicole Stelle 
Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075 (2005). 
 199 See Lynn A. Staeheli & Don Mitchell, USA’s Destiny? Regulating Space and Creat-
ing Community in American Shopping Malls, 43 URB. STUD. 977, 977–98 (2006). 
 200 Id. at 982–89. 
 201 In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, the Supreme Court’s most recent case 
on the quasi-public nature of private shopping malls, the Court denied a federal con-
stitutional right of free speech to hand out political pamphlets in the mall’s common 
areas.  447 U.S. 74, 80–81 (1980).  However, the Court upheld a provision of the Cali-
fornia State Constitution protecting such activities and rejected the mall owner’s ar-
gument that this violated his First Amendment rights.  Id. at 88. 
 202 MARGARET KOHN, BRAVE NEW NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC 
SPACE 9–10, 191–93 (2004). 
 203 Id. at 74–78. 
 204 Id. at 193–94. 
 205 Staeheli & Mitchell, supra note 199, at 978. 
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gree of publicness, pluralism, and promotion of democratic debate 
and discourse in public forums as socially desirable,206 purely private 
spaces will usually not suffice.207
Accordingly, the true challenge in attempting to revive govern-
mentally-owned public spaces is to make them thriving and vibrant 
again, but without simultaneously mimicking the constraining prac-
tices of private spaces.  This requires governments and groups to 
work together to create a new type of public space management—
one that works to increase the stakeholding of local groups and util-
izes their special affinity for the resource, while, at a minimum, ensur-
ing at least a certain level of genuine publicness and broader democ-
ratic values. 
B. “Public Commons” in Public Spaces 
This Section offers a concise description of different types of ac-
tual mixed public spaces in New York City, providing a substantive 
framework within which the following sections will analyze the three 
main challenges that apply to all types of spaces along the public-
common continuum: (1) identifying the bilateral incentives of the 
relevant parties, (i.e. the government and the local groups); (2) ad-
dressing the possible tensions between the “public” and the “com-
mon” elements, and exposing informal or voluntary mechanisms that 
can be employed to resolve such tensions, thus preventing an explicit 
legal conflict; and (3) revealing why current law is unsatisfying in 
dealing with the complexities of public commons and developing 
ways to reshape it to better promote the socially desirable policy. 
New York City’s total acreage of public open space (38,147) is the 
largest in the U.S. among high-population-density cities, both in abso-
lute area and as a percentage of total city acreage (19.7%).208  Over 
29,000 acres are devoted to the 1770 city-owned parks, around 220 of 
 206 KOHN, supra note 202, at 198–205; Staeheli & Mitchell, supra note 199, at 989; 
DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC 
SPACE 130–52 (2003). 
 207 See Elizabeth Blackmar, Appropriating “the Commons”: The Tragedy of Property 
Rights Discourse, in THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC SPACE 49, 49–50 (Setha Low & Neil Smith 
eds., 2006) (arguing that the current proliferation of commercial centers and resi-
dential subdivisions that include the term “commons” in their names alludes to the 
romantic concept of Commons in New England towns, but that these spaces are void 
of genuine values and practices of public discourse). 
 208 The Trust for Public Lands, Total Parkland as Percent of City Land Area FY 
2006, http://www.tpl.org/content_documents/ccpe_TotalAcres_asPercentofLandAr 
ea.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2007). 
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which are defined by the City as “large parks.”209  The remaining 1550 
parks are further broken down into 360 small parks (sitting ar-
eas/triangles/malls), ninety neighborhood parks, 960 playgrounds, 
and forty undeveloped sites serving effectively as small parks.210  Ac-
cording to Partnerships for Parks, a joint program of the NYC Parks 
& Recreation Department and the non-profit City Parks Foundation, 
there are over 3800 grassroots, community-based organizations 
throughout the City, of which about 2700 are chiefly dedicated to 
parks.211  Overall, such “friends of” groups are active in over half of 
the City’s parks.212 The nature and size of these groups considerably 
diverge between the different parks.  In the following sub-sections, I 
offer a rough, non-exhaustive taxonomy of the various types of local 
group involvement in NYC’s parks, starting with more informal pat-
terns and moving up to more full-fledged types of public commons. 
1. Informal User Groups: McCarren Park Moms 
Close to the “public” end of the public-common continuum, one 
finds informal and non-institutionalized “friends of” groups working 
to improve and steward “their” local park.  An example is the Park 
Moms group involved in the Vincent V. Abate playground, located 
within McCarren Park in Brooklyn.213
The informal Park Moms group was initiated in 1996 by Susie 
Monagan, who was motivated into action when her child demanded 
outdoor playing space.214  At the time, the playground was badly ne-
glected; most swings were missing, and the garden was weeded 
 209 Interview with Mr. Jack T. Linn, Assistant Comm’r, and with Mr. Warner Johns-
ton, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, City of New York Parks & Recreation Dep’t (Apr. 23, 2007). 
 210 E-mail from Dana Rubinstein, Deputy Director, Office of Public Recreation, 
NYC Parks & Recreation, to author (Jan. 10, 2006) (on file with author).  In addition, 
there are about 2,100 “Greenstreets”—concrete triangles and traffic islands con-
verted by the City into green spots.  Id. 
 211 Interview with Mr. Jason Schwartz, Dir., and with Ms. Emily Maxwell, Acting 
Dir., Catalyst Program, Partnerships for Parks (Apr. 24, 2007).  Partnerships for Parks 
provides various services to such groups, including volunteer and permit coordina-
tion, technical assistance, outreach activities, and catalyst programs aimed at mobiliz-
ing grassroots “social capital.”  Id. 
 212 Id.  The difference between the number of groups and that of community-
active parks derives from the fact that in many cases, there are multiple groups work-
ing in the same park.  For example, there are around thirty groups involved with the 
Flushing Meadows Park in Queens.  Id. 
 213 See Lehavi, Property Rights, supra note 166, at 35–37 (describing in more detail 
the group’s activity in 1996–2003); Telephone Interview with Katherine Naplatarski 
(Mar. 1, 2006) (updating information after the publication of Lehavi, Property Rights). 
 214 Id. 
LEHAVI_FINAL 1/11/2008  1:59:14 PM 
2008] MIXING PROPERTY 183 
 
over.215  Monagan started to establish an informal network of 
neighbors, most of them young parents who lacked sufficient home 
playing space.216  This informal process was carried out through tele-
phone calls, notices posted on-site, and, at a later stage, through a 
newsletter and an e-mail list.217
Because Park Moms is an informal group, it acted from the outset 
(and still does today) through the City Parks Foundation as a fiscal 
agent.218  The group’s annual “budget,” which is currently around 
$7,000, comes chiefly from the local city councilmember’s office, with 
smaller amounts coming from local businesses and other private do-
nors.219  The group’s political clout has shown itself to be useful from 
early on, when in 1999 the group successfully lobbied the council-
member to have a sprinkler pool built next to the playground at a 
cost of about $600,000.220
Although Park Moms does not have regular meetings, and the 
communication is casual in nature, one can always expect a “critical 
mass” of neighbors to show up for a given project.221  These dynamics 
may also help to explain the group’s decision-making process. Al-
though there are neither official managers nor a formal voting sys-
tem, the initiator of a certain project will often gain consensus for her 
proposed action.222  Apparently, in such an informal setting, consen-
sus seems necessary to maintain the atmosphere of good will contri-
bution. 
Interestingly, the group did not fall apart when Monagan moved 
outside the City.223  The current core of the group consists of four ac-
tivists who meet every few months, with approximately 20--250 locals 
participating in the various activities.224  Although the group does not 
currently apply for special grants and no longer maintains a newslet-
ter, it continues to hold regular activities throughout the year, includ-
ing a spring concert series, cleanup events, tree-planting, outreach 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 As of November 2000, Susie had a mailing list of 300 people for the Park 
Moms’ Newsletter and forty to fifty addressees on her regular hardcopy mailing list.   
Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 One donation came from the Exxon Mobil Foundation to finance the bush 
plantings project, serving probably as an informal measure of compensation for pol-
lution from its nearby factory.  See supra note 209. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
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activities with local schools, and a current campaign to have an ice-
skating rink installed nearby.225  The group continues to collaborate 
with other groups in McCarren Park, and is accordingly part of an in-
formal thread created between different groups of users.226
In sum, although the McCarren Park Moms has stuck to its in-
formal character, and its activities are not anchored in formal agree-
ments with the City’s Parks Department, it continues to be a signifi-
cant force in the ongoing management and improvement of the 
playground, to have considerable political clout, and to generally 
maintain harmonious relations with the City and with other user 
groups. 
2. Incorporated User Groups: The Carl Schurz Park 
Association 
The Carl Schurz Park Association prides itself on being the “old-
est community-based volunteer park association” in New York City.227  
In the late 1960s, a small group of parents joined forces to help up-
grade Carl Schurz Park, located in Manhattan’s Upper East Side.228  
Though it had initially focused on the playground, after the City’s 
major fiscal crisis in the 1970s which threatened the viability of the 
entire City and of its open spaces in particular, the group was spurred 
to broaden its commitment and to take an increasingly active role in 
maintaining and improving the entire park.229  The Association in-
corporated in 1974 as a tax-exempt non-profit organization with vol-
unteer directors and officers, and it enjoys pro bono legal counsel-
ing.230  Its first major restoration project, the replacement of cherry 
trees that died from a faulty drainage system, came in 1976 and was 
considered a precedent in the sense that the community group had 
financed the installation of the trees and sod and provided the drain-
age pipes in the city-owned park while the Parks Department pro-
vided the labor.231
Since then, the Association grew in numbers and in its scope of 
action.232  It currently has 1,200 active dues-paying members and en-
 225 See supra note 209. 
 226 Id. 
 227 See Carl Schurz Park Association, http://www.carlschurzparknyc.org/index. 
html (last visited Feb. 1, 2007). 
 228 See A Brief History of Carl Schurz Park Association, http://www.carlschurz 
parknyc.org/history.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2007). 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
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gages in multiple activities, including the purchase of plants and gar-
dening supplies; the renovation of dog-runs; the provision of supplies 
and special programs for kids; and financial and logistic support for 
annual community events such as art shows, summer concerts, and 
holiday festivals.233  Until recently, the Association also funded the 
cost of a full-time workfare supervisor, a portion of a year-round gar-
dener’s salary, and the Association is currently in negotiations with 
the Park’s Department to fund half the salary of a park enforcement 
officer.234
Despite playing an essential role in the maintenance and man-
agement of the Park for some time, only recently did the Association 
start negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding with the Parks 
Department to formalize the relationship.235  Until now, it has been 
the informal ability of the Association to navigate matters vis-à-vis the 
Parks Department, the police, and elected city and state officials that 
has led the Association to a successful record of goal accomplish-
ment, whether this was facilitated by public funding or by the Associa-
tion’s own funds, which come primarily from donations, member 
fees, government grants, and program services.236
The Carl Schurz Park Association presents, therefore, a vivid ex-
ample of both the potential in ongoing grassroots coordination be-
tween the Park’s local users, and of the severe governmental con-
straints that may often necessitate the transition to hybrid forms of 
management and finance in many publicly owned spaces to prevent 
their deterioration and dereliction.237
3. Formal Mixed Management: Prospect Park Alliance 
and ComCom 
In a number of parks, New York City has entered into formal co-
operation arrangements with non-profit corporations for the full or 
partial management, maintenance, and improvement of the publicly-
owned park.238  Probably the best known example is the Central Park 
 233 Id. 
 234 E-mail from David Williams, President, Carl Schurz Park Assoc., to author 
(Mar. 7, 2006) (on file with author). 
 235 Id. 
 236 In the fiscal year 2003, the Association had overall revenue of $163,879.  See 
supra note 227. 
 237 See Toni Whitt, Civic Pride and Volunteerism Bring Allure Back to Riverside Park, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2006, at B4 (telling the similar story of Upper Manhattan’s River-
side Park). 
 238 Besides Central Park, Prospect Park, and Bryant Park, which will be discussed 
separately in sub-sections (3) and (4), similar arrangements exist in Battery Park and 
in Randall’s and Ward’s Island Parks in Manhattan; in the Bronx River Park in the 
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Conservancy, a non-profit organization established in 1980, which has 
been awarded renewing management agreements to “ensure[] the 
continuing maintenance, public programming, and capital restora-
tion of Central Park.”239  While these instances of formal partnerships 
between the city and non-profit organizations may be seen as just an-
other example of Public-Private Partnerships discussed previously, the 
various park partnerships do seem to possess additional traits that 
emphasize the role of the local community both in the structure of 
the non-profit organization and in its relations with the park users, 
hence constituting a distinctive type of “public commons.” 
An interesting example is Prospect Park in Brooklyn.240  The Park, 
which serves over six million visitors a year, is managed by the col-
laboration of the Parks Department and the Prospect Park Alliance, a 
non-profit established in 1987.241  Whereas the Prospect Park Alli-
ance’s regular operating budget is about $5 million (coming chiefly 
from private and government support, and the rest from fees and 
other user-based revenues), in 2005 the Alliance completed an un-
precedented $116 million campaign for capital improvements in the 
Park.242
The Park has over 5000 volunteers, some of them individuals and 
groups who feel a special affinity to the Park, and others who are part 
of organized programs of schools, religious institutions, corporations, 
Bronx; and in the Greenbelt Park in Staten Island.  E-mail from Dana Rubinstein, 
supra note 210.  According to city officials, there are around twenty five undeveloped 
(i.e., largely natural) parks in New York City that have regional appeal and can draw 
sufficient funds through concessions or private donations, so as to make them candi-
dates for innovative management schemes.  Interview with Linn & Johnston, supra 
note 209. 
 239 On April 27, 2006, the contract was renewed until 2014.  See The Central Park 
Conservancy, http://www.centralparknyc.org/abooutcpc/partnership (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2007). 
 240 The data in the following paragraphs is based primarily on a series of inter-
views I held between 2000 and 2005 with the following Prospect Park Alliance em-
ployees: Rachel Amar, Carol Anastasio, Carol Ann-Church, Danny Cunningham, Pam 
Fishman, and Dawn Torres; and on interviews with several group members who at-
tended a ComCom meeting in Prospect Park on Nov. 30, 2000. 
 241 Although there is no formal agreement between the entities about the overall 
management of the Park, the relationships are recognized and validated, inter alia, 
in the Alliance’s structure.  See supra note 240.  Tupper Thomas, the President of the 
Alliance, is an employee of the City’s Parks Department, and was originally hired as 
the Park’s first administrator in 1980 by then Parks Commissioner Gordon Davis.  Id.  
In addition, the Alliance’s board includes ex officio the Parks Commissioner, the 
Brooklyn Borough President, and local city councilmembers, alongside members 
from the private sector.  Id. 
 242 Prospect Park Alliance, Annual Report 2005, at 2, 6–7, available at http://www. 
prospectpark.org/general/annual_reports/PPA2005Annual.pdf. 
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mandated community service, etc.243  In addition, in 1995, the Pros-
pect Park Alliance formed the Community Committee (informally 
known as ComCom), aimed at serving “as a conduit for information 
and feedback.”244 ComCom includes over eighty groups of park users 
and other interest holders (such as local businesses and elected offi-
cials), with representatives of about thirty to forty of these groups 
regularly participating in ComCom’s meetings, which are held about 
six times a year.245  These meetings are intended primarily to inform 
and advise the groups of future plans and projects.246  Besides meet-
ings of general interest, the Alliance also maintains frameworks for 
community dialogue regarding distinctive portions of the Park.  For 
example, the General Playground Committee meets four times a year 
to discuss issues pertaining to the seven playgrounds located through-
out the Park, with meetings between the Alliance and a certain indi-
vidual playground group held on an ad hoc basis.247
As for the forces driving individuals with a shared specific interest 
in the Park to organize into a group, it should be noted that some 
groups, such as the Prospect Park Running Club, were already organ-
ized before the establishment of ComCom.248  Other user groups 
evolved spontaneously, usually following conflicts about their specific 
uses.249  For example, following recurring complaints about dogs dig-
ging holes causing people to trip, the Park’s management handed 
out leaflets to dog owners and summoned them to an open meet-
ing.250  The result was the establishment of FIDO, an interest group 
representing dog owners in the Park.251
Although ComCom is not intended to be a forum for dispute 
resolution among different types of users, its structure has often 
proved efficient in facilitating informal dialogue among groups dur-
ing conflicts, although it is the Alliance,252 which, together with the 
city, has the formal power of resolution over the rules of use in the 
Park.253  One example of an unresolved conflict is between FIDO and 
 243 See supra note 240. 
 244 Prospect Park Alliance, PROSPECT PARK NEWS, Dec. 1999–Feb. 2000, at 3 (on file 
with author). 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. 
 247 See supra note 240. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. 
 253 See Prospect Park—Overview, http://www.prospectpark.org/general/main.cfm 
?target=home. 
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the Brooklyn Bird Club, a group of bird watchers, following the lat-
ter’s recurring complaints of dogs scaring away the birds.254  In other 
cases, however, the inter-group dialogue has facilitated efficient use 
arrangements in the Park, as was the case with the creation of differ-
ent lanes for bikers and runners.255 In this respect also, the ComCom 
framework proves to be an overall successful conduit for information 
and coordination both between the Alliance and the groups, and 
among the different user groups themselves.256
4. Formal Sub-Local Structures: Bryant Park and BIDs 
Beyond ad hoc partnerships between governments and private 
non-profits, cities have been experimenting with formal sub-local 
structures, which combine private, public, and common elements.257  
Of particular interest here are Business Improvement Districts 
(BIDs), which establish a territorial subdivision of a city in which 
businesses and residential property owners are subject to additional 
district-specific taxes reserved to funding services and improvements 
within the district.258  BIDs have proven to be generally efficient in 
both the establishment and the maintenance of amenities at the sub-
local level.259  While a BID does have some public characteristics,260 
the members of this corporation nevertheless enjoy the benefits of 
smaller-scale governance and improved supply-demand responsive-
ness.261
One BID, which has helped to revolutionize a public space from a 
place of dereliction and crime into a thriving, economically self-
 254 See supra note 240. 
 255 Id. 
 256 See SETHA LOW ET AL., RETHINKING URBAN PARKS: PUBLIC SPACE AND CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY 37–68 (2005) (identifying distinctive park use patterns among different 
ethno-cultural groups in an earlier field study of Propsect Park, conducted in 1996–
97). 
 257 Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. 
REV. 503 (1997). 
 258 Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and 
Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 368–69 (1999) [hereinafter Briffault, BIDs].  
There are currently several hundred BIDs in the U.S., and dozens in New York City 
alone.  LAWRENCE O. HOUSTOUN, JR., BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS 2–3, 150–51 
(2d ed. 2003). 
 259 Id. 
 260 This is because the initial consent of the city is required for the BID’s estab-
lishment (in addition to that of the majority of property owners), and the city is also 
represented on the BID’s board of directors and maintains supervision powers over 
its activities.  Briffault, BIDs, supra note 258, at 378, 439. 
 261 Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 77–
78 (1998). 
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sustaining urban jewel, is the Bryant Park Restoration Corporation 
(BPRC).262  Bryant Park, located behind the New York Public Library 
in the heart of Manhattan, fell into decay in 1960s due to city neglect, 
and became a haven for drug dealers and muggers while keeping 
away others.263  In the late 1970s, when the Rockefeller Brothers Fund 
was seeking to contribute money to renovate the similarly declining 
Public Library building, it made mitigating the Park’s problems a 
condition for its support.264  In 1980, BPRC was set up and started to 
promote a renovation plan for the Park.265  After twelve years of pro-
fessional and public debate over the plan, and the capital expendi-
ture of eighteen million dollars (two-thirds coming from the city, and 
the rest from the private sector), the Park was renovated and soon 
became a hub for daily leisure activities—about 5000 local office 
workers using it to eat their lunch—as well as for events such as open-
air concerts and night movies.266
The Park’s annual budget of about five million dollars is financed 
chiefly by the levies imposed on the businesses located in the BID’s 
area, concessions from the restaurant, café and kiosks in the Park, 
and fees for special events.267  The city donates more than $250,000 
each year.268  The ongoing success of the Park has fed the neighbor-
ing assets by dramatically driving up leasing activities and real estate 
prices, making the BID a “win-win” setting for its private financiers 
and its users.269  While the use of the Park is regulated by BPRC, in-
cluding restrictions on certain activities such as panhandling and dog 
running, and limiting late-night closing hours, the Park is generally 
kept open and inviting to the wide public.270
5. Publicly-Authorized, Conditional Commons: 
Community Gardens 
In many cases, the very establishment of a public space is not the 
fruit of a pre-designated governmental act of land dedication, but the 
result of dynamic, largely grassroots phenomena that are typical of 
many cities.  One prominent process is the de facto or de jure con-
 262 See ALEXANDER GARVIN ET AL., URBAN PARKS AND OPEN SPACE 45–54 (1997). 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. 
 267 See Pranay Gupte, Raising Private Funds To Remake a Public Park, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 
26, 2006, at 15.   
 268 See GARVIN ET AL., supra note 262, at 50, 56–57. 
 269 Id. at 53–54. 
 270 Id. at 55. 
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version of vacant or abandoned lands into community places.271  In 
these scenarios, the root causes for the long term vacancy or aban-
donment of properties often also point to the potential, and even the 
necessity, of converting the land for such purposes or other beneficial 
reuses.272
The most prominent case of conversion of vacant or abandoned 
lots into community spaces in the United States is that of New York 
City’s community gardens.273  These spaces started to evolve sponta-
neously in vacant or deserted city-owned lots in the mid 1970s,274 
mainly in some of the city’s toughest and most poor neighborhoods, 
through the grassroots work of civic-minded and concerned individu-
als.275  Over the years, more than 600 gardens evolved on city lots, 
serving as models of community pride and ingenuity.276  Following 
their creation, the city established the Greenthumb program in 1978 
to assist local gardeners with the care and security of the gardens.277  
Yet, during that period, the gardens had no formal status as such,278 
and their use was carried out through either short-term licenses or 
without any formal permission.279
 271 See, e.g., Community Gardens are a Growing Trend, GLEBE & INNER CITY NEWS 
(N.S.W.–Austl.), Mar. 29, 2000 (describing the proliferation of community gardens 
in public properties in Sydney and other Australian cities); Schukoske, supra note 
188, at 355 (depicting a similar phenomenon in Canada). 
 272 Two authors offer insight into the prevalence of vacant and abandoned prop-
erties stemming from macro trends such as de-industrialization and population shifts 
to suburban communities alongside site-specific environmental, financial and legal 
pitfalls.  See ALAN MALLACH, BRINGING BUILDINGS BACK: FROM ABANDONED PROPERTIES 
TO COMMUNITY ASSETS 3–8 (2006); Lavea Brachman, Vacant and Abandoned Property: 
Remedies for Acquisition and Redevelopment, LAND LINES, Oct. 2005, at 1. 
 273 See, e.g., RUTH H. LANDMAN, CREATING COMMUNITY IN THE CITY: COOPERATIVES 
AND COMMUNITY GARDENS IN WASHINGTON D.C. (1993); Kenneth Reich, Los Angeles 
Community Garden Takes Root in South Los Angeles, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2002, at B4. 
 274 The first space established was on a vacant lot at the corner of Bowery and 
Houston Streets in Manhattan in 1973.  See Mary K. Fons, The Green Guerillas, THE 
COOPERATOR, Sep. 2003, available at http://cooperator.com/articles/914/1/The-
Green-Guerillas/Page1.html.  The garden is currently named after its initiator, the 
late artist Liz Christie.  Id. 
 275 See Green Guerillas v. City of New York, as reported in N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 2002, at 
28.  
 276 See generally MALVE VON HASSELL, THE STRUGGLE FOR EDEN: COMMUNITY GARDENS 
IN NEW YORK CITY (2002) (giving a comprehensive study of community gardens in 
Manhattan’s Lower East Side). 
 277 Id. at 48, 52. 
 278 The then-official maps showed vacant lots where community gardens were lo-
cated.  Id. at 18. 
 279 According to one report, in 1998, the City leased around 1,000 properties to 
700 community groups.  Schukoske, supra note 188, at 386. 
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The tension between the de facto community use of the spaces 
and their formal public ownership erupted in the mid-1990s, when 
the city decided to auction hundreds of lots to developers for afford-
able housing projects.280  The first wave of auctions was avoided when 
two non-profit organizations purchased 112 gardens in 1999.281  Fol-
lowing a second wave of litigation over several hundred other lots, 
which involved the Attorney General of the State of New York,282 a 
deal was struck in 2002 between the City and the State.283  According 
to the agreement, beyond the ninety-three city-owned gardens that 
were already under the jurisdiction of the Parks Department and 
other non-development agencies and one hundred gardens that were 
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education, 198 of the 
city-owned sites that were under the jurisdiction of the Housing De-
partment were offered to the Parks Department.284  Although the 
agreement denies the gardens formal parkland status, the city has de-
clared that it has no current development plans for these gardens 
and that any future development plans would have to undergo review 
procedures according to the New York State Environmental Quality 
Review Act285 and the City’s land use review procedure.286  Addition-
ally, any proposed development plans would require the City to seek 
an alternate site for the garden.287
Although the conflict allegedly ended in community triumph, the 
routine of the community gardens is laden with continuous obsta-
 280 This decision was initially unsuccessfully challenged in courts by community 
groups and the State of New York.  See, e.g., N.Y.C. Coal. for the Pres. of Gardens v. 
Giuliani, 670 N.Y.S.2d. 654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 666 N.Y.S.2d 918 (App. Div. 
1998). 
 281 The Trust for Public Land and the New York Restoration Project acquired 112 
lots for a total of $4.2 million and placed the gardens in permanent land trusts.  Dan 
Barry, Sudden Deal Saves Gardens Set for Auction, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1999, at B1. 
 282 See State v. City of New York, 713 N.Y.S.2d 360 (App. Div. 2000) (granting a 
temporary restraining order).  Contrarily, community groups’ suits were dismissed 
for lack of standing.  N.Y.C. Coal. for the Pres. of Gardens, 666 N.Y.S.2d. at 918; Worley 
v. Giuliani, 8 F. App’x. 131 (2d Cir. 2001); Green Guerillas, supra note 275, at 28.  
 283 Jennifer Steinhauer, Ending a Long Battle, New York Lets Housing and Gardens 
Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 19, 2002, at A1. 
 284 Memorandum of Agreement between the State of New York and the City of 
New York (Sept. 17, 2002) [hereinafter State-City Memorandum] (on file with au-
thor). 
 285 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 2002) (codified at 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.10–.20 (2000)). 
 286 N.Y. City Charter, ch. 8 § 197-c (2001). 
 287 State-City Memorandum, supra note 284, § 6(B).  One hundred ten sites were 
designated as “subject for development” following a streamlined garden review proc-
ess, and twenty-eight as eligible for immediate development.  Id. §§ 6(a), 7. 
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cles.288  Two of the agreement’s conditions for the prolongation of 
the Greenthumb program and the protection of the gardens were the 
continuation of fund allocation through either the federal Commu-
nity Development Block Grant (CDBG) program or other external 
sources, and the formal registration and actual use of the various 
gardens.289  However, in view of the City’s continuous preparedness 
for the possibility of federal defunding, and as some of the gardens 
(around fourteen percent as of 2007) are no longer eligible for 
CDBG funds because of a rise in the neighborhood’s socioeconomic 
status, the City has started allocating funds for the gardens, but may 
obviously become pressed for dollars should this trend intensify.290
Yet, as more responsibilities are shouldered by the commoner-
gardeners, their ability to maintain the garden increasingly depends 
on their organizational, economic, and political capabilities.  Some-
what ironically, even though the struggle for the preservation of the 
gardens was carried out under the flag of “environmental justice,” 
there is currently an abundance of prosperous gardens in Manhattan 
and affluent areas in Brooklyn, and a lack thereof in impoverished 
areas such as the South Bronx, into which councilmembers often pre-
fer to direct budgets to affordable housing for local constituents.291
In sum, in the context of public spaces in New York City, the pub-
lic-common spectrum can be roughly portrayed as including the fol-
lowing points: 
City sub-
structures (BIDs); 
joint mainte-
nance & mgmt. 
agreement 
public-common 
(non-profit) 
joint mainte-
nance & mgmt. 
public mainte-
nance  & mgmt. + 
incorporated 
“friends of” 
groups
public main-
tenance & 
mgmt. + in-
formal user 
groups    
full-scale 
public 
mainte-
nance & 
mgmt.  
publicly-
authorized, 
conditional 
commons 
Public             Common
 
Chart 3 
The Public-Common Continuum 
(In New York City Public Spaces) 
 
 288 Interview with Edie Stone, Dir., Greenthumb (Sept. 15, 2004). 
 289 Id. 
 290 Interview with Linn & Johnston, supra note 209. 
 291 Interview with Stone, supra note 288. 
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C. The Bilateral Incentives Behind Public Commons 
The evolution of the different types of “public commons” in gov-
ernmentally-owned public spaces is a result of complex processes, 
which are often resource-specific, that cannot be attributed to a sin-
gle set of factors.  Yet the gradual shift from traditional full-scale pub-
lic provision, management, and financing to the various mixed mod-
els seems to reflect current forces, potentials, and constraints that 
drive the chief stakeholders, mostly the cities on one hand, and, on 
the other hand, the local groups of residents and businesses physi-
cally surrounding the public spaces. 
The government’s modes of operation in publicly-owned re-
sources, such as its public spaces, naturally combine normative policy 
setting with practical budgetary constraints.  In New York City, during 
substantial periods since the 1970s, the City faced acute fiscal crises 
that simply caused it to withdraw from many of its responsibilities in 
public parks, leaving the parks to the fate of grassroots self-help ac-
tivities or other private initiatives.292  When such patterns have ex-
isted, as portrayed above, public spaces have managed to thrive.  In 
the other less fortunate instances, City neglect has perpetuated and 
exacerbated urban decline.293  While throughout most of this era of 
fiscal duress the City at least maintained the rhetoric of responsibility 
for public spaces, the subsequent reign of Mayor Giuliani was often 
characterized by idealization of overreaching privatization294 and even 
by finger pointing at embittered residents.295
Recent years have seen a shift in priorities and budget-setting for 
parks, with the City acquiring almost 300 acres of new parkland since 
2002 and substantially increasing both capital investments and oper-
 292 See Tridib Banerjee, The Future of Public Spaces: Beyond Invented Streets and Rein-
vented Places, 67 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 9, 12 (2001). 
 293 Fred Siegel, Reclaiming our Public Spaces, in METROPOLIS: CENTER AND SYMBOL OF 
OUR TIMES 369, 374 (Philip Kasinitz et al. eds., 1994).  The City’s maintenance staff 
was cut almost in half during the late 1970s and early 1990s.  Id.  Between 1994 and 
2001, the Parks Department’s operating budget was cut by nearly thirty percent.  
Joanne Wasserman, Parks Go to Seed for Lack of Green; Many Suffer from Fund Cuts, Ne-
glect, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 4. 
 294 See E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION IN THE CITY: SUCCESSES, FAILURES, LESSONS 210–238 
(2005) (describing privatization schemes in the Parks Department during this era, 
including a short-term experiment with competitive outsourcing of park mainte-
nance, and a more durable outsourcing program for maintenance of the Depart-
ment’s fleet of vehicles and equipment). 
 295 Joanne Wasserman, Let Volunteers Fix Parks, Rudy Says, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 
14, 2001, at 4.  In one instance, Giuliani challenged New Yorkers to fix seedy city 
park conditions themselves: “anyplace where a park isn’t what the community wants 
it to be, they can volunteer to make it better. . . . I would use that as a challenge . . . 
[that] we don’t have to rely on Big Brother to do everything.”  Id. 
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ating budgets for parks.296  Yet the City does not seem to be simply re-
verting to traditional public provision.  Beyond the fact that mainte-
nance and renovation levels are still unsatisfactory at times,297 espe-
cially in several sites that the City has effectively given up on,298 
current public policy explicitly emphasizes the crucial role that resi-
dents and businesses should play in turning what otherwise “would 
merely be open spaces” into “centerpieces of their communities.”299  
Accordingly, the myriad economic and organizational models com-
bining private capital, community activity, or outsourced manage-
ment aiming at attaining site-specific self sufficiency are heralded as 
necessary ingredients in ensuring the success of government-owned 
public spaces, especially with respect to long term maintenance 
tasks.300
From the viewpoint of local residents and businesses, successful 
public spaces are instrumental in providing use benefits alongside 
consequential benefits such as a rise in adjacent real estate prices and 
a boost to economic and commercial activity.301 This type of stake-
holding is especially dramatic given the potential adverse flip side of 
neglected and derelict public spaces as harboring crime, disorder, 
and economic and social decline.302  These interests typically distin-
guish neighbors from residents located further away from the public 
space, who usually use it less frequently because of travel costs or be-
cause of the availability of closer-by spaces, consequently being less 
 296 Timothy Williams, City Says Some Wretched Areas Aren’t Worth Fixing, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 6, 2006, at B1 [hereinafter Williams, Wretched Areas].    
 297 Timothy Williams, Heralded as Parks, but Looking More Like Dumps, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 12, 2005, at A1. 
 298 Williams, Wretched Areas, supra note 296 (describing the dereliction of the 
Bronx’s University Woods Park, and quoting Parks Commissioner Adrian Benepe 
that investment in some spaces is “a waste of money . . .  [j]ust because something is 
in our inventory doesn’t mean it’s worth taking care of.”). 
 299 See CITY OF NEW YORK PARKS & RECREATION, BIENNIAL REPORT 2004–2005 13, 
available at http://www.nycgovparks.org/download/biennialReport/parks_biennial_ 
report_2004-2005.pdf. 
 300 See OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, LIVING PLACES: CLEANER, SAFER, 
GREENER (2003) (official report on the significant yet limited role that entities such 
as public-private partnerships, local land trusts, and “friends of” should play in public 
space stewardship in Britain). 
 301 See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text. 
 302 Studies have linked the state of a certain public space and the rate of crime 
and disorder in and around it.  See OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: CRIME 
PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN DESIGN 11–12 (1972); Robert J. Sampson et al., 
Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCI. 918, 
918–19 (1997). 
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influenced by the public space,303 except in the relatively rare cases in 
which the space has broader-scale non-use values.304
The existence of such special interests may explain the emer-
gence of grassroots forms of cooperation and coordination in gov-
ernmentally owned resources, which are often able to overcome col-
lective action problems even when the local group of users is 
otherwise unorganized and has no preexisting formal contribution or 
enforcement mechanisms.  In many such cases, the initiators of the 
group activity are moved to action by the prospects of private gain, 
but at the same time may have relatively low discount rates and are 
often able to employ informal monitoring techniques that ensure re-
ciprocity and continuous effort by a sufficient amount of locals to 
reach a critical level of sustainable cooperation.305
D. Possible Tensions between “Public” and “Commons” 
The common-public mixture can also be, however, a source of 
friction when the interests of the local group of “commoners” are in 
tension with those of the general public or other subgroups of it.  
These conflicts may erupt during each one of the life-stages of the 
public space: its establishment, its ongoing operation, and its possible 
conversion or re-designation for a different public purpose. 
The community gardens serve as an example for such a possible 
tension during the establishment stage, or more exactly, in that spe-
cific instance, during the process of the formal validation and recog-
nition of the informal vacant-lots-turned-into-public-spaces.  Interest-
ingly, as is the case in many impoverished areas in New York City, the 
contest over the appropriate use of the publicly owned lands—
community gardens versus affordable housing—reflected not only a 
local/general public debate, but also an internal conflict among locals 
themselves. 
The ongoing operation of the public spaces may also entail com-
mon/public frictions.  City supervision may usually be sufficient to 
ensure that mixed-managed parks such as Bryant Park or Prospect 
Park would be generally inviting to the public at large, and would 
even sufficiently tolerate to a certain extent the “undesirables,” such 
as homeless people.  However, more intimate public spaces, and es-
 303 See, e.g., Been & Voicu, supra note 175, at 22 (showing that the positive impact 
of community gardens on residential property values declines as the distance from 
the garden grows). 
 304 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 305 See Lehavi, Property Rights, supra note 166, at 42–48 (offering a detailed analysis 
of this phenomenon). 
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pecially the community gardens in which the local groups are en-
gaged in communal recreation and in individual plot gardening may 
experience more frequent problems of exclusionary behavior by the 
“commoners.”  Thus, whereas Greenthumb requires community gar-
deners to keep the garden open to the general public “for a mini-
mum of ten daylight hours per week between the months of May and 
October,”306 the gardeners solely hold the keys to the garden’s gates 
and employ numerous informal exclusionary practices aimed at en-
suring that the garden remains firmly under the control of the local 
group.307
Common/public controversies may also arise when the govern-
mental owner wishes to convert or re-designate the land for a new 
purpose that will serve the general public or a different subgroup of 
it, such as when a certain public space is located in the designated 
path of a highway, or when the government wishes to build a certain 
public building on the plot, or to sell the land to a private developer 
and divert the sale revenues for other budgetary purposes.308  While 
such potential conflicts may be addressed in advance in cases involv-
ing formal mixed management or responsibility-sharing agreements 
between the city and the sub-local group, in instances involving more 
informal versions of public commons, the resolution of such conflicts 
is made by either political power-plays or by the judicial application 
of general doctrines that do not necessarily take into account the 
uniquely mixed characteristics of the various types of public com-
mons. 
E. The Over- and Under-Inclusiveness of Current Law 
The legal regime governing issues such as the dedication of lands 
for public spaces, the permitted uses in these spaces, the relationship 
between the interests of the abutting neighbors and those of the gen-
eral public inside and outside the city, and the authority of the city to 
convert the spaces for other purposes or to alienate the land is mostly 
a result of state-based common law and legislative enactments.  Al-
though diverging between the different states, some principles seem 
to be generally characteristic of the legal status of public spaces, and 
particularly parks. 
 306 See Standard “Parks Greenthumb Garden License” Agreement § 8 (on file with 
author). 
 307 See VON HASSELL, supra note 276, at 68–74 (describing such inter- and extra-
group disputes about the gardens). 
 308 See Lehavi, Property Rights, supra note 166, at 3, 48–56 (elaborating on such po-
tential conflicts). 
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First, parkland is either created explicitly through overt provision, 
such as restrictions set out in a deed of donation or in a specific legis-
lative enactment, or implicitly such as through continuous use by the 
city of the parcel for park purposes.  There is, however, a difference 
as to which purposes the park may be used based on the nature of the 
original dedication.  Thus, dedication of parkland by private donors 
(“private dedication”) is construed strictly and generally cannot be 
overridden even by express legislative authority to the municipality.  
However, parkland that is created through purchase or condemna-
tion of the land by the city and its dedication for park purposes 
(“public dedication”) is subject to a more lenient approach when the 
city later wishes to allow broader uses, such that a general legislative 
authorization for municipalities to do so will usually suffice.309
In a minority of states, New York being the most notable, the 
courts have developed a public trust doctrine for public parks “to the 
benefit of the people of the State,” which requires “the direct and 
specific approval of the State legislature, plainly conferred” to use 
publicly dedicated parks for any other purpose.310  Public dedications 
in such states are thus endowed with an additional layer of legal pro-
tection, requiring the city to receive specific state authorization.311
Second, outright alienation of land dedicated for park purposes 
requires direct legislative approval by the relevant state.312  The proc-
ess of state legislative authorization is often lengthy and cumbersome, 
especially when the park has received state or federal funding.313  New 
York State, for example, is generally more willing to allow alienation 
when the city provides a substitute land for the transferred land.314  
Public re-designation or alienation procedures would usually be ac-
companied by state or city environmental or land use review proce-
dures.315
 309 See 64 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 1557 (2006).   
 310 See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1055 
(N.Y. 2001) (forbidding the construction of a water treatment plant in the park, ab-
sent specific state authority). 
 311 See Michael Benn, Towards Environnmental Entrepeneurship: Restoring the Public 
Trust Doctrine in New York, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 203 (2006) (critiquing the park/non-
park test in New York’s public trust doctrine and a calling for the application a more 
flexible “public use” test). 
 312 See 10 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 28.38 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
 313 See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF PARKS & RECREATION, HANDBOOK ON THE 
ALIENATION AND CONVERSION OF MUNICIPAL PARKS 13–14, 21–22 (rev’d ed. 2005). 
 314 Id. at 21. 
 315 See Benn, supra note 311, at 217–25 (discussing such requirements in New York 
State). 
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Third, courts are generally reluctant to recognize the special in-
terests of adjacent residents and businesses in the public space in 
cases of conflict.  In Reichelderfer v. Quinn,316 the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that although the neighboring owners that filed 
the suit had enjoyed special benefits by the presence of the Rock 
Creek Park, such increase in value did not create interests constitu-
tionally protected against diminution in value by the government, 
even when their properties had been previously assessed for these 
benefits.317  More broadly, state courts have emphasized that the 
beneficiary of the public space is the entire general public of the gov-
ernment, such that the subgroup of adjacent residents is not entitled 
to special privileges in the public space, let alone to any power of veto 
over the public park’s conversion or alienation.318
Current law, which has been shaped against the background of 
traditional governmental provision and maintenance of public 
spaces, seems to be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive in dealing 
with the preservation of public spaces or the regulation of their use.  
On the one hand, it sets out procedural and institutional barriers to 
deviation from the public space’s original designation.  On the other 
hand, it fails to recognize the evolving reality in which the special af-
finity of neighbors, alongside more general processes of outsourcing 
and privatization in cities, fundamentally changes the manner in 
which many public spaces are regularly maintained and operated.  
Even if the legal regime were to knowingly advocate the use of steady 
rules over open-ended, resource-specific standards, it would still need 
to be reconsidered in order to more appropriately manage the public 
commons. 
F. Providing Mixed Solutions for Public Commons 
As is the case with public-private and private-common property 
regimes, the growth of mixed public-common regimes requires that 
the law be readjusted in appropriate cases to create the correct incen-
tives for the protagonists and to properly balance between the “pub-
lic” and “common” elements.  In principle, this revision should apply 
to the different life stages of public spaces or other resources that are 
systematically shifting in the direction of mixed property.  A full scale 
development of such a legal regime is outside the scope of this Arti-
cle. 
 316 287 U.S. 315 (1932). 
 317 Id. at 323. 
 318 64 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 1557 (2006). 
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One suggestion that I make with respect to otherwise locally un-
compensated conversions or alienations of pre-designated public 
spaces, and which is especially relevant to persistent yet informal 
models of group stewardship of public resources, is to create a sub-
stantive group remedy in favor of the local group of users according 
to the following principles: First, the remedy would be collective and 
non-pecuniary, focusing primarily on the provision of a nearby substi-
tute facility.  Second, the remedy would be based on a liability rule 
principle, meaning that the group would not be entitled to block the 
public plan until the remedy is assured.  Third, such a remedy would 
be awarded only if the affected local group is able to demonstrate the 
long lasting patterns of significant group stewardship as well as the 
occurrence of a substantial loss.  Fourth, the costs of providing the 
remedy would exceed neither the aggregate social costs of the loss of 
the public space nor the new project’s estimated surplus.319
V. TRI-LAYERED PROPERTY REGIMES 
Some of the dual property regimes portrayed in the previous 
parts, as well as many other property configurations, involve in fact a 
tri-layered regime.  For example, CICs, which have been depicted as 
representing a private-common regime, are complemented by signifi-
cant public regulation that is typical of similar land uses and are 
naturally subject to other forms of public intervention including 
property taxation. Indeed, many property regimes in various contexts 
can be viewed as combining private, common, and public traits. 
There are, however, several property configurations which are of 
special interest in the sense that they explicitly seek to balance pri-
vate, common, and public interests as having more or less equal 
weight, so that they can be seen as genuine trilateral or tri-layered 
property regimes.  A primary example is “third sector housing,” 
which has been developed in the past few decades as an alternative 
housing strategy, which seeks to expand homeownership among 
lower-income households but at the same time to mitigate the in-
creased risks that have brought a high number of such households to 
mortgage foreclosures and loss of their homes.320  An interim model 
 319 See Lehavi, Property Rights, supra note 166, at 85–97 (providing a full elaboration 
of this suggested remedy). 
 320 JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP: THE CHANGING 
LANDSCAPE OF RESALE RESTRICTED, OWNER OCCUPIED HOUSING 1 (2006), http://www 
.nhi.org/pdf/SharedEquityHome.pdf. 
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that aims at achieving these goals through a normatively oriented 
mixed property regime is that of “shared equity housing.”321
This basic model, which has been implemented in a number of 
different versions in the U.S., generally conforms to the following 
principles: (1) the people who occupy the housing units are home-
owners, not tenants; (2) the equity stemming from the property value 
is shared between the homeowner and the community, meaning that 
while the homeowner keeps the value of his investments over time on 
resale, the rise in value stemming largely from community investment 
both at the initial stage and at later periods remains mostly within the 
community; and (3) beyond resale revenue allocation, the individual 
and the community share many other burdens and benefits through-
out the different life stages of the housing project.322
One particularly intriguing version, briefly noted here, is that of 
Community Land Trusts (CLTs), currently numbering nearly two 
hundred throughout the U.S.323  CLTs, which are community-based 
non-profit organizations that started to form in the 1970s mainly 
through the initiative of local activists, have been receiving growing 
financial and administrative support from municipal and state offi-
cials, and as of 1992 also from the federal government, when CLTs 
became eligible for HOME funding and other forms of HUD assis-
tance.324  Moreover, in 2001, Fannie Mae, the largest U.S. organiza-
tion working with lenders to provide affordable loans for families of 
low and moderate income, approved a Uniform Community Land 
Trust Rider, which readily facilitates the establishment and expansion 
of CLTs,325 although most CLTs in the various cities still include no 
more than a few dozen housing units.326
The basic idea behind the CLT is that a community-based non-
profit acquires the land for the purpose of retaining ownership in it 
 321 Id. 
 322 Id. at 2–4. 
 323 According to a recent survey, there were 186 CLTs in the U.S.  See Rosalind 
Greenstein & Yesim Sungu-Eryilmaz, A National Study of Community Land Trusts (Lin-
coln Institute of Land Policy, Working Paper WP07YS1, 2007), at 4.  Other promi-
nent versions of shared equity housing are Deed-Restricted Homes and Limited Eq-
uity Cooperatives.  DAVIS, supra note 320, at 13–18, 23–31. 
 324 Id. at 21. 
 325 Id. at 19–22. 
 326 Id. at 22.  In the past few years, however, local governments have been playing 
an increasingly dominant role in the creation and financing of CLTs because they 
view the CLT mechanism as preferable to other forms of governmental activity for 
ensuring the goals of permanent housing affordability and subsidy retention.  This 
may affect the number of housing units in new CLTs.  The City of Irvine, California 
announced in May 2006 its commitment to fund the creation of nearly 10,000 CLT 
units within a decade.  Greenstein & Sungu-Eryilmaz, supra note 323, at 4. 
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forever for affordable housing purposes. The individual homeowner 
leases the land for a long period of time (typically ninety-nine years), 
and is the owner of the building that is erected on the land.327  The 
lease agreement on the land divides the property bundle between the 
individual and the CLT both during the tenancy and upon its trans-
fer by inheritance or resale.328  Thus, for example, the homeowner 
must occupy the land as his primary residence and may not sublease 
the land without the CLT’s consent.329  He is required to receive CLT 
permission for major capital improvements and is obligated to prop-
erly maintain the building.330  If the homeowner fails to pay the mort-
gage, his interests may be taken over by the CLT.331
To keep the land available for affordable housing in perpetuity, 
even in neighborhoods that enjoy rising values, when the homeowner 
decides to sell, the CLT repurchases the property itself or monitors 
and approves the property’s direct transfer from seller to buyer.  In 
any case, the resale price is restricted to a formula, which aims at giv-
ing the departing homeowner a fair return on his investment, while 
at the same time giving future income-eligible homebuyers a fair and 
affordable access to this housing, and so forth for generations to 
come.332
Another intriguing facet of this tri-layered property regime con-
cerns the CLT’s board structure.  The CLT is an open-membership 
organization for all those that live within the wider geographic area 
which the CLT defines as the “community.”333  One-third of the CLT 
board is comprised of representatives of the leasehold-
ers/homeowners.334  Another third is elected to represent the inter-
ests of other community residents outside the CLT affordable hous-
ing units.335  The final third is elected by the two-thirds who have 
already been elected, with seats often reserved for the local govern-
 327 This is the case for a project involving detached housing.  When the building is 
a multi-unit condominium or cooperative, the building’s owner may be a CIC or a 
different non-profit corporation, with individuals owning the different housing units.  
DAVIS, supra note 320, at 18. 
 328 Id. at 20. 
 329 Id. 
 330 Id. 
 331 Id. at 20–21. 
 332 Greenstein & Sungu-Eryilmaz, supra note 323, at 29–33. 
 333 Whereas in the past the definition of “community” was limited to the bounda-
ries of a single neighborhood, many current CLTs delineate the community’s bor-
ders more broadly to include multiple neighborhoods, an entire city, or even a whole 
metropolitan area.  DAVIS, supra note 320, at 20. 
 334 Id.  
 335 Id. 
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ment’s representatives, private lenders, or other community-based 
organizations.336  This tri-layered structure is intended to mediate be-
tween the interests of the leaseholders/homeowners as individuals, 
their interests as a group, and the interests of other stakeholders in 
the broader “community.”  Thus, the private, common, and public 
elements are fascinatingly intertwined in the CLT to implement the 
constitutive normative goal of sharing entitlements and responsibili-
ties in a mixed-income household community, which is driven by a 
mixed ideological and social vision. 
VI. TOWARD A UNIFYING THEORY OF MIXED PROPERTY REGIMES 
Though the different regimes portrayed in the previous parts di-
verge in many respects, I suggest that the systematic growth and ex-
pansion of hybrid forms of property regimes can be generally ana-
lyzed on a consolidated basis, which would lay out the descriptive and 
normative underpinnings of mixed regimes with the purpose of de-
lineating a unifying theory for these property configurations. 
A. Mixed Optimal Scales and Production Functions 
In his seminal work on property in land, Robert Ellickson identi-
fies the problem of efficient boundaries as implicating the proper 
choice of a property regime.337  Illustrating activities in land as falling 
into the categories of small, medium, and large events, Ellickson sug-
gests that while the regulation of small events conforms to the Dem-
setzian model of private property parcelization, other simultaneous 
uses and activities that have a broader effect may necessitate com-
plementary external institutions such as norms of neighborliness, 
common-law nuisance rules, and government land-use rules.338  When 
a significant portion of the uses and activities are large in scale, espe-
cially when they are rationally supported by the potential advantages 
of economies of scale and risk-spreading, efficiency may require the 
construction of common property regimes containing internal bind-
ing institutions for cooperation and coordination. 339
Later literature, which has built up on Ellickson’s insight about 
the complexity embedded in the simultaneousness of various activi-
ties and uses, has conceptually divided property regimes as compris-
ing of distinct, though related, realms of rights allocation and of gov-
 336 Id. 
 337 Ellickson, supra note 25, at 1332–35. 
 338 Id. at 1327–34. 
 339 Id. at 1334–35. 
LEHAVI_FINAL 1/11/2008  1:59:14 PM 
2008] MIXING PROPERTY 203 
 
ernance.340  This approach realized the necessity of occasionally sepa-
rating between the two realms so that certain bundles of the property 
sticks relating to specifically important activities and uses that defy 
formal boundaries would be regulated by substantial group or public 
governance, although such complexity creates high startup costs for 
the property system.341
While this framework may still be considered as keeping intact a 
revised yet coherent division between private, common, and public 
property, market forces and corresponding legal rules have been 
continuously challenging and shifting these boundaries.  As Lee 
Anne Fennell notes in the context of residential properties in metro-
politan areas, there is growing recognition that the value of proper-
ties is often determined not only by the onsite attributes, but more-
over by people, things, services, and conditions lying beyond what we 
traditionally refer to as the property’s boundaries.342  Beyond physical 
externalities which have been long explicitly considered and ad-
dressed in the law, the growing prevalence of preferred spatial asso-
ciations comprising of the “right” neighbors which provide and en-
sure the maintenance of the “correct” neighborhood ambience,343 has 
been a major force behind the creation and legal validation of new 
property institutions such as CICs that create an explicit mix both in 
the rights allocation and in the governance structure.  In this and 
other contexts, collective action problems are addressed by the crea-
tion of new types of regimes located in interim points along the sides 
of the private-common-property triangle and inside it.  More broadly, 
the proliferation of legal phenomena such as CICs, although often 
socially contestable, demonstrates the institutional potential in ex-
tending the choices of property regimes so as to attain certain values 
and goals in light of changing realities or shifting normative concep-
tions. 
Yet there is obviously more to efficiency-based property arrange-
ments than the issue of boundaries and externalities.  As Demsetz 
himself addressed in his own sequel, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights 
 340 See Heller, Common, supra note 3, at 330–32; see also Carol M. Rose, Left Brain, 
Right Brain and History in the New Law and Economics of Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 479, 
479–84 (2000) (offering a slightly different, yet basically similar division). 
 341 Smith, Two Strategies, supra note 3, at 470, 474–79. 
 342 Lee Anne Fennell, Exclusion’s Attraction: Land Use Controls in Tieboutian Perspec-
tive, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF 
WILLIAM OATES 163, 164–68 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006). 
 343 Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1228 
(2006). 
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II,”344 the decision about the preferred mechanisms for control of re-
sources involves a host of other issues such as the ability to obtain cer-
tain societal goals through the work of markets, the incentive struc-
ture for productivity in different institutions, the nature of the 
personal relations between members in a given community, and the 
complexity level of different organizations.345  Whereas Demsetz still 
believes that these parameters point toward the private vertex, lessons 
learned in the U.S. and throughout the world—as presented in this 
Article, for example in the Public-Private Partnerships context346—
demonstrate that the correct answer is often to be found at the in-
terim point, and that any property equilibrium may be challenged by 
the occurrence of endogenous and exogenous changes that Demsetz 
himself had identified in his original work as necessitating a shift in 
property regimes.347
While my analysis of mixed property is by no means antagonistic 
to the “bundle of rights” analytic concept of property or to the exclu-
sion/governance literature, and rather may be seen as an extension 
of them, it is distinctive in that it points to (1) the proliferation of sys-
tematic social institutions embracing an explicit mixture in both the 
rights allocation and the property governance axes; (2) the disso-
nance between this growing phenomenon and the current doctrinal 
framework that is still much influenced by the public/private dichot-
omy (or actually a trichotomy); (3) the potential normative advan-
tages of explicit mixed institutions, past and present, over the more 
conventional paradigms of property 
B. Mixed Non-Utilitarian Values 
To say that property is not only about efficiency or utility is an 
axiom (not to say a cliché).  As briefly mentioned in Part I, propo-
nents of “pure” private property rights have advocated them also in 
the name of liberty, autonomy, political freedom, etc.  Similarly, the 
creation of publicly-owned resources has not been restricted to public 
goods (in the narrow economic sense),348 but was, and is, also a tool 
to attain societal goals such as vertical equity, social integration, or 
preservation of human dignity.  Ideologies and moral visions of the 
world have been playing, and will continue to play, a key role in the 
way we shape property regimes. 
 344 Demsetz, Theory II, supra note 15. 
 345 Id. at 657–65. 
 346 See supra Part II.A. 
 347 Demsetz, Theory I, supra note 7, at 350. 
 348 See supra note 38 and accompanying notes. 
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What seems to typify many of the mixed property regimes is that 
they are based on explicitly-mixed ideologies, combining, or more 
exactly compromising, desires for individualism and economic 
maximization with notions of equity and solidarity.  The Renewing 
Kibbutz explicitly defines itself as located midway between individual-
ism and collectivism, and has correspondingly created a mixed prop-
erty regime.  New York City currently advocates ideas of economic ef-
ficiency and self-sustainability alongside its basic commitment to 
publicness, openness, and democracy in the way it manages its public 
spaces.  CLTs mediate between the desire of the homeowner to enjoy 
a value gain on the property upon resale and their commitment to 
the community and to future homeowners who wish to enjoy the 
same access to affordable housing that the seller had initially enjoyed.  
Sometimes, the implementation of such a mixed ideology ends up in 
resounding failure.349  In such instances, the circle (or actually, the 
triangle) simply cannot be squared.  This does not mean, however, 
that conscious societal decisions to follow a middle ideological or 
moral pattern cannot be successfully translated, in appropriate cases, 
to hybrid property regimes. 
Mixed ideologies may not always necessitate the creation of ex-
plicitly mixed property regimes.  For example, a growing number of 
authors have challenged private property from within, arguing that 
private property itself is or should be laden with principles of social 
responsibility and distributive justice,350 and calling to reexamine spe-
cific exclusionary or self-promoting bundles in the property stick.351
I do not argue that private property should be libertarian in na-
ture, and there may be a host of good reasons to limit exclusionary 
property rights in the name of public or community interests, or oth-
erwise to craft private property regimes with the purpose of attaining 
goals such as equity.  An interesting example is the evolution of pri-
vate property rights in water in the Western United States.  The Colo-
 349 See NATALIE MEHRA, FLAWED, FAILED, ABANDONED: 100 P3S—CANADIAN & 
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 1 (2005), http://www.healthcoalition.ca/ffaf.pdf (report-
ing alleged Public-Private Partnerships failures, which at times made necessary full re-
publicization of resources); see also infra Part VI.C. 
 350 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROPERTY 20–21 (2006); David Lametti, The (Virtue) Ethics of Private Property: A Frame-
work and Implications, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW, OBLIGATIONS AND 
RESTITUTION 39, 44–56 (A. Hudson ed., 2003); Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distribu-
tive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 767–78 (1999). 
 351 Lior Strahilevitz has critiqued the two traditional pillars of private ownership: 
the right to destroy and the right to exclude.  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information 
Asymmetries and the Right to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835 (2006); Lior Jacob Stra-
hilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005). 
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rado Constitution, along with subsequent legislation, regulation, and 
case law, created a unique “prior appropriation” system designed to 
combat monopolization and speculation by riparian or upstream 
owners, by giving a broader group of stakeholders the chance to ap-
propriate water required for their “beneficial use.”352  Private rights in 
water were thus designed with an egalitarian ideology in mind (al-
though one can actually argue that certain features of the regime, 
such as substantial limits on trade, effectively created a mixed regime). 
However, such approaches to private property, as they are void of 
any inherent normative content, have their limits.  Designing a pri-
vate property regime means that individuals are allocated formal 
rights as well as broad decisionmaking powers with respect to re-
sources.  Whereas the initial allocation of rights may change based on 
a certain normative viewpoint (as the example of water rights indi-
cates), and some limits may be placed on the boundaries of such 
rights on an ongoing basis while still considering the regime to be 
“private,” the very decision to place prominent powers in the hands 
of individuals does have a certain meaning and does bear some fore-
seeable consequences that cannot simply be dismissed as nonexistent.  
Not always can certain goals and values be attained through a private 
property regime for a certain resource, just as the case may be for 
public or common property regimes. 
And this is exactly where institutionalized property mixtures 
come into play.  When the results emanating from a certain property 
regime are deemed unsatisfactory, society’s collective decisionmaking 
bodies may very well change the property regime, including a switch to 
a uniquely-crafted property mixture.  Thus, it seems that those advo-
cating certain values such as social responsibility or distributive justice 
should focus their attention on suggesting a systematic property re-
gime that is most suitable for these purposes rather than simply view-
ing private property as a useless, freely-manipulated legal concept. 
C. Flexibility in Trial-and-Error 
A change in a property regime regulating a certain resource may 
often be a daunting task.  Beyond the inherent transition costs that 
typify any sort of legal change,353 socially desirable changes in prop-
erty regimes may often be delayed or blocked altogether by politically 
powerful actors who are anxious mainly about the distributive out-
 352 David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the Creation of 
Property Rights, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 3, 41–56 (2005).   
 353 See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 816–
40 (2002). 
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comes of the proposed change in the legal status-quo.354  At least in 
some instances, a switch from a certain “pure” property regime to a 
mixed regime that combines substantial elements from the previous 
regime, rather than a wholesale switch to another pure property re-
gime, may prove to be more feasible by mitigating the level of resis-
tance, at least to some degree. 
When the mixed property regime is considered optimal regard-
less of the issue of possible opposition, then such a regime may enjoy 
the best of both worlds.  This is very much the case with the Renewing 
Kibbutz.  The Renewing Kibbutz was designed based on a model 
which sought to combine partial privatization and rewards for indi-
vidual productivity alongside the assurance of a redistributive “safety 
net” for disadvantaged members and the preservation of substantial 
group control over life in the Renewing Kibbutz.  This interim ideo-
logical approach also proved instrumental in alleviating the resis-
tance of members who had good reasons to fear the change, espe-
cially the elderly generations who had founded the cooperative 
Kibbutz or lived in it their entire productive adult lives, and thus had 
no private savings.355  In other instances, the choice of a mixture may 
be a conscious compromise, for example, when a deregulatory switch 
to a market regime is constrained by a “grandfathering” of rights to 
current stakeholders that threaten to veto the change.356
This relative advantage of mixed property regimes may also be 
manifested when such a regime yields unsatisfactory results, and the 
policymaker wishes to redesign the regime by either amending it or, 
in some cases, by reverting back to the original “purer” regime.  In 
such instances, the mixed nature of the property regime may make it 
easier to correct errors that are revealed following the trial. 
The British railway system is a case in point.  This industry, which 
had been nationalized during the 1940s but had been suffering 
chronic budgetary and infrastructure problems causing a sharp de-
crease in demand by consumers, underwent a swift process of privati-
zation during the early 1990s under which track maintenance and 
operation were outsourced and train services to passengers were 
franchised to private firms, while both functions still remained heav-
ily financed by the public.  Within a few years, it became obvious that 
 354 See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
 355 See Vered Levi-Barzilay, At the Top of the Food Chain, HAARETZ.COM (Eng. ed.), 
July 2, 2004. 
 356 See Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 
290–96 (2000) (arguing that switches to regimes of tradable pollution rights in the 
U.S. took place only when the initial permits were not auctioned, but grandfathered, 
to existing, politically powerful polluters). 
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this model of privatization was failing miserably: maintenance levels 
were poor, as tragically revealed by a deadly accident in Hatfield in 
2000; franchised train companies were unable to respond to chang-
ing needs especially because of the rigid structure of the franchise 
agreements; the firms that were supplying and leasing trains and car-
riages to the operating companies were blamed with over-charging; 
and the multitude of governmental entities charged with financing 
and regulating the industry, with unclear division of responsibilities 
between them, further added to market distortions and to a major 
waste of public funds.357
Following these failures, the British government has taken several 
steps.  It terminated the outsourcing railway maintenance agreements 
for compensation and currently provides these services in-house by 
Network Rail, a non-profit body financed by public funds and regu-
lated by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR).358  ORR has also re-
cently threatened to start an antitrust inquiry against the train-leasing 
companies unless they agreed to cut the prices charged from the 
publicly-subsidized train operators.359  More broadly, the government 
has designed a new scheme whereby it will take charge of the railway 
strategy by setting the level of public expenditure and making deci-
sions on what should be purchased, and ensuring that other govern-
mental agencies will be given clearer mandates and will work closely 
with private firms to provide a renewed scheme of collaboration.360
These changes were made possible, both legally and politically, 
largely because of the fact that even under the privatization scheme, 
the formal property regime governing British railways was mixed and 
maintained sufficient public powers (alongside substantial public 
funding) over the industry to allow for such changes when the model 
proved to be flawed.  Although in theory the government could have 
always re-publicized fully privatized resources by using its taking 
power, there is no doubt that this latter measure would have proven 
much more burdensome and costly, both financially and politically. 
Evidence from other countries about such reorganizations, occa-
sionally taking even the form of wholesale re-publicization, similarly 
 357 See HER MAJESTY’S DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, THE FUTURE OF RAIL—
WHITE PAPER 10–18 (2004) [hereinafter H.M.T.,THE FUTURE OF RAIL].  
 358 For example, one firm, Carillion, was paid £17.6 million for contract termina-
tion and transfer of its assets to Network Rail, in a move aimed at saving £100 million 
of public funds annually.  Andrew Clark, Carillion Receives £17m Rail Payoff, THE 
GUARDIAN, June 2, 2004, at 18. 
 359 See David Teather, Train-leasing Banks Face Inquiry amid Claims that Public is Being 
Ripped Off, THE GUARDIAN, June 29, 2006, at 27. 
 360 H.M.T.,THE FUTURE OF RAIL, supra note 357, at 6–8, 41–52. 
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reveals the potential flexibility embedded in mixed regimes in mat-
ters facing constant changes in market or public conditions.361  While 
there may be cases, for example in the Public-Private Partnerships 
context, in which the government would neglect to take advantage of 
this better potential for change due to apathy, political capture by 
current private stakeholders, or loss of institutional knowledge that 
practically prevents the government from regaining public control, 
the formal structure of such partnerships is a significant tool that may 
facilitate required changes in the property equilibrium. 
D. Integrity of Legal Categories 
The distinction between private law and public law continues to 
constitute a great challenge and is a source of constant debate in le-
gal scholarship.  The rival opinions as to whether an authentic line 
can be drawn between the two realms—in the sense that each realm 
maintains a distinct, coherent integrity of underlying principles that 
does not collapse into mere tautology or into indistinguishable as-
similation and diffusion between the two realms—will probably con-
tinue to clash in the future, and this Article will not even attempt to 
fully resolve the matter.362
The debate over such line drawing is not of course “the sole and 
despotic dominion”363 of law.  The public/private distinction is con-
sidered one of the “great dichotomies” of Western thought,364 and is 
central to many fields in the humanities and the social sciences.  As 
Jeff Weintraub notes, the inherent difficulty in addressing this issue 
stems largely from the abundance of definitions and types of organiz-
ing categories and the lack of a unifying theory, or at least of a con-
scious dialogue between these different worlds of discourse.365  Thus, 
 361 See, e.g., Natalie Alcoba, City Eyes Takeover of Water, Sewer Operations, THE 
HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Ontario, Can.), Aug. 31, 2004, at A1 (reporting the re-
publicization of water and watershed facilities in the City of Hamilton); Adrian 
Rollins, La Trobe Hospital Return to Public Control, THE AGE (Melbourne, Austl.), Oct. 
24, 2000, at 4 (reporting the early termination of a twenty-year contract for the pri-
vate operation of a regional hospital in the Australian State of Victoria). 
 362 See N.E. Simmonds, Justice, Causation and Private Law, in PUBLIC & PRIVATE: 
LEGAL, POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 149 (Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves 
& Ursula Vogel eds., 2000) (analyzing the debate over the integrity of such a distinc-
tion). 
 363 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (facsimile 
ed. 1979) (1766). 
 364 NORBERTO BOBBIO, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF 
STATE POWER 1–3 (Peter Kennealy trans., 1989). 
 365 Jeff Weintraub, The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction, in PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 1, 2–4 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar eds., 
1997). 
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in the classic liberal tradition, the distinction is largely drawn between 
the administrative state representing the public sector and the mar-
ket reflecting the private sector.366  A different type of taxonomy, ad-
vanced by writers such as Hanna Arendt367 and Jürgen Habermas,368 
designates the “public sphere” as the realm of political community, in 
which members actively participate in collective decisionmaking, as 
opposed to matters that are chiefly of private concern.  Here, the dif-
ferent arenas may depart from the liberal distinctions.  Just as the 
“public realm” can exist outside the state (such as in voluntary or-
ganizations), an administrative state which lacks active participation 
cannot be regarded as genuinely “public.”369
Yet another type of public/private discourse, largely the province 
of social theory, touches upon the tension between privacy/intimacy 
and social interaction.  Whereas some writers such as Erving Goffman 
have stressed the importance of separation,370 others such as Jane Ja-
cobs have seen outside-the-state, unmediated interaction between 
persons, even if apolitical in nature, as a major positive force of a vi-
brant human society.371  The recognition of such different, co-existent 
forms of sociability has prompted calls for departing from the pub-
lic/private dichotomy.  Sociologist Alan Wolfe has called, for exam-
ple, to define a new realm of publics, distinct from private and public, 
which would be comprised of families and kinship networks, associa-
tions, ethnic and racial groups, and other types of sub-society com-
munities.372  While such a sociological trichotomic delineation may 
translate conveniently to the property private-common-public divi-
sion, the law has broader lessons to learn from the constant efforts in 
other fields to define and redefine the borders between the different 
spheres of life, recognizing the essentiality of line-drawing but at the 
same time understanding that these distinctions are uncertain, 
changeable, and often misleading. 
 366 Id. at 8–10. 
 367 HANNA ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 30–31, 114–20 (1962). 
 368 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: 
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 208–27 (Thomas Burger trans., 
1989) (1962). 
 369 LUKE GOODE, JÜRGEN HABERMAS: DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 3–28 
(2005) (offering a recent analysis of Habermas’s concept of the “public sphere”); 
HABERMAS, supra note 368, at 160–61. 
 370 ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 115 (1959). 
 371 JANE JACOBS, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 71–73 (1961). 
 372 Alan Wolfe, Public and Private in Theory and Practice: Some Implications of an Uncer-
tain Boundary, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 182, 196–201 (Jeff 
Weintraub & Krishan Kumar eds., 1997). 
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For property law, which sets out the ways in which we handle re-
sources and the human relationships around them, this means that 
property regimes may be placed in various points along the sides of 
the property triangle and within it, and that such placements are 
meaningful in the sense that they should implicate the legal rules 
that govern the property regime.  Property mixtures, namely those 
configurations that are located at a relative distance from the trian-
gle’s vertices, can be the subject of distinctive legal regimes that 
properly meet the societal needs at the basis of the mixed regime 
while at the same time ensuring a sufficient level of stability and cer-
tainty that is paramount for a legal system as a whole.  The borders 
between private, common, and public property can be crossed at 
times without nullifying the underlying importance of such basic divi-
sions.  As demonstrated by the different mixed property regimes por-
trayed in this Article, legal regimes may be built and particular issues 
can be addressed by combining long lasting traditions with legal in-
novation to create a tailor-made, socially desirable mixed form of re-
source allocation and management. 
CONCLUSION 
Pure property regimes are useful classifications and points of de-
parture, but in today’s complex and dynamic world, more than ever 
before, they do not represent a considerable portion of the ways in 
which property rights are structured, allocated, and enforced.  As 
Carol Rose has demonstrated, even William Blackstone’s famous de-
piction of private property as endowing absolute rights was more 
wishful thinking than a depiction of the doctrinal reality of his time—
an anxiety-relieving rhetoric of clarity uttered against a complex 
background of overlapping interests and mixed societal values.373
At the same time, however, the fact that the current landscape of 
property regimes is richer, and consists of various configurations that 
are located along endpoints and interim points on and within the 
property triangle, is far from viewing property as an inherently empty 
concept that can be freely manipulated,374 or which simply collapses 
into an ad hoc expression of societal values or other types of prefer-
ences in the resolution of a specific scenario.375
 373 Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 
603–06 (1998). 
 374 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 8, at 364–66, 385–94 (offering a critical review 
of this line of thought, which is allegedly supported by the post-Hohfeld realist writ-
ing, as well as by more contemporary schools such as the economic analysis of law). 
 375 See Simmonds, supra note 362, at 164–69 (critiquing this position in the more 
general context of private law rights). 
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Richness does not mean nihilism.  The construction of various 
property configurations, each with its unique bundle of entitlements 
and responsibilities, can be made in a way that both better meets the 
changing needs of society and provides the platform for the possibil-
ity of future change, and at the same time maintains a sufficient level 
of coherence and certainty that validates property law as a meaning-
ful mechanism that stands firmly on its own feet.  As this Article has 
demonstrated, the reality of successful mixed property regimes, 
alongside the need to legally amend or update other such regimes so 
as to enable them to more appropriately achieve the normative goals 
that stand at the basis of their establishment, point both to the con-
tinuing integrity of property law and to its potential to address future 
promises and challenges. 
 
